Islamic institutions, the status of women, and economic growth by Glover, Michael Emanuel




























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science in the 






































Dr. Ruth Uwaifo-Oyelere, Advisor 
School of Economics 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Byung-Cheol Kim 
School of Economics 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Dr. Rehim Kilic 
School of Economics 











 I wish to thank my adviser, Dr. Ruth Uwaifo-Oyelere, for her commitment to the 
project, guidance, and encouragement throughout. I also wish to thank my professor of 
Government and Politics of the Middle East, Karolyn Benger, for the original suggestion 
to write a term paper on an economic topic related to the Middle East for her class, and 


















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 




1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 13 
Islam and Economic Growth Literature 13 
Gender Inequality and Economic Growth Literature 15 
3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  18 
Correlations 19 
Divided by Categories 29 
4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 61 
Extremity Indexes and 1990s Growth 62 
Extremity Indexes and 2000s Growth 63 
Investigation into Why the Changed Sign 64 




LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1: Correlations of veil variable with others 19 
Table 2: Correlations of female discrimination variable in school with others 19 
Table 3: Correlations of women’s difficulty obtaining land variable with others  20 
Table 4: Correlation of the average real GDP with variables related to gender 20 
Table 5: Correlations of gender institution variables with each other 22 
Table 6: Correlations of polity variable (1970-2007) with other variables 23 
Table 7: Correlations of polity variable (1990-2007) with other variables 23 
Table 8: Correlations of civil liberties/political rights score with other variables 23 
Table 9: Correlations of Freedom of the Press rating with other variables                      24 
Table 10: Correlations of corruption index with other variables 24 
Table 11: Correlations of battle deaths with other variables 25 
Table 12: Correlations of restrictions on minority religions with other variables 26 
Table 13: Correlations of Islam as official religion dummy with other variables 27 
Table 14: Correlations of having Islam as a basis for legal system with others 28 
Table 15: Correlations of having Sharia and other variables. 28 
Table 16: Economic development statistics divided by percentage Muslim 30 
Table 17: Average oil exported per country divided by percentage Muslim 31 
Table 18: Development and gender statistics divided by percentage Muslim 31 
Table 19: Characteristics of political rule statistics divided by percentage Muslim 32 
Table 20: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by %Muslim 33 
Table 21: Islamic institutions related to gender stats by percentage Muslim 34 
Table 22: Demographic statistics divided by region 35 
vi 
 
Table 23: Economic development statistics divided by region 36 
Table 24: Development and gender statistics divided by region 37 
Table 25: Characteristics of political rule divided by region 38 
Table 26: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by region 39 
Table 27: Islamic institutions related to gender 40 
Table 28: Demographic statistics divided by obligation to wear veil 41 
Table 29: Economic development stats divided by obligation to wear veil 41 
Table 30: Development and gender stats divided by obligation to wear veil 42 
Table 31: Political rule stats divided by obligation to wear veil 42 
Table 32: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by veil 42 
Table 33: Islamic institutions related to gender stats divided by veil 43 
Table 34: Demographic stats divided by women’s access to land, loans, property 44 
Table 35: Economic development statistics divided by women’s access 44 
Table 36: Development and gender stats divided by women’s access 45 
Table 37: Political rule stats divided by women’s access 45 
Table 38: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by women’s access 46 
Table 39: Islamic institutions related to gender stats divided by women’s access 46 
Table 40: Demographic stats divided by Islamic law 47 
Table 41: Economic development stats divided by Islamic law 47 
Table 42: Oil stats divided by Islamic law 48 
Table 43: Development and gender stats divided by Islamic law 48 
Table 44: Political rule stats divided by Islamic law 48 
Table 45: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by Islamic law 49 
Table 46: Islamic institutions related to gender stats divided by Islamic law 49 
Table 47: Demographic stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 52 
vii 
 
Table 48: Economic stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 52 
Table 49: Development & gender stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 53 
Table 50: Political rule stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 53 
Table 51: Religious freedom stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 54 
Table 52: Gender institutions stats divided by restrictions on minority religions 54 
Table 53: Demographic stats divided by Exindex1 55 
Table 54: Economic development stats divided by Exindex1 56 
Table 55: Development and gender stats divided by Exindex1 56 
Table 56: Political rule stats divided by Exindex1 57 
Table 57: Relgious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by Exindex1 57 
Table 58: Islamic institutions related to gender stats divided by Exindex1 58 
Table 59: Demographic stats divided by Exindex2 58 
Table 60: Economic development stats divided by Exindex2 58 
Table 61: Development and gender stats divided by Exindex2 59 
Table 62: Political rule stats divided by Exindex2 59 
Table 63: Religious freedom and Islamic institution stats divided by Exindex2 59 
Table 64: Islamic institutions related to gender stats divided by Exindex2 60 
Table 65: Extremity indexes and 1990s growth regression results 62 
Table 66: Extremity indexes and 2000s growth regression results 63 
Table 67: Extremity indexes and 1990 to 2007 growth regression results 64 
Table 68: Blurring institutional variables regression results 65 
Table 69: Switching decades regression results 67 




Below are the definitions of the variables used in this study. In parentheses next to 
the variable name is the abbreviation that will be used for the tables, if an abbreviation is 
used. 
 
Percentage Muslim (percMus): the percentage of Muslims in the country. 
 
Religious Fractionalization (relFrac): the probability that two random people drawn from 
the population would belong to different religions. The religions are divided more or less 
broadly depending on the proportion of the members of a religion. For example, in Italy 
where there are few Muslims, the categories are split into Roman Catholic, Muslim, and 
Atheist, but in Iraq where there are mostly Muslims and few Christians, the categories are 
more specific within Islam yet broader for Christianity, so that the categories are  Shii 
Muslim, Sunni Muslim, and Christian (Encyclopedia Britannica 2001). 
 
HDI (hdiYY): the Human Development Index is a summary of a country's achievement in 
attaining (1) A long and healthy life (2) Access to knowledge and (3) A decent standard 
of living. It is computed as an equally weighted average of normalized levels of life 
expectancy at birth, education (which is two thirds adult literacy rate and one third gross 
enrollment ratio), and GDP per capita (UNDP 2008). 
 
Birthrate (birth): the average annual number of births during a year per 1,000 persons in 
the population at midyear; also known as crude birth rate. The birth rate is usually the 
dominant factor in determining the rate of population growth. It depends on both the level 
of fertility and the age structure of the population. (CIA (2008) as cited by Nationmaster). 
 
GDP Growth Rates YY-YY (grYY-YY): the average of the growth rate of Real GDP Chain 
per capita for the years YY to YY (for example, 1990-1999 would be gr90-99) (Heston et. 
al 2009). 
 
CGDP: purchasing power parity adjusted Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current 
price (Heston et. al 2009). 
 
RGDP: purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Laspeyres) 
(Heston et. al 2009).  
 
Corruption Index (corrupt): this index ranks countries in perceived levels of corruption, 
according to entities within the country, with 10 being the best and 1 being the worst 
(Transparency International 2008).  
 
Polity IV (PolityYY): polity IV variable ranks countries on a 21-point scale by the 
political style of the rule of the regime, with -10 being the most authoritarian, and +10 
being the most democratic. The 1970s figure is the average for all of the 1970s, and so 
on. One difference in my approach from the creators of the index is that I coded an 
"interregnum" period (anarchy or no effective central government) as a missing value 
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instead of zero. I did this because I thought that a period of "-9" authoritarianism from 
1960-1975, then a five-year "interregnum period," then a return to "-9" authoritarianism 
ought to receive an average score for the 1970s of -9, instead of -4.5 (Marshall 2009). 
 
Battle deaths (battleD): the total number of battle deaths occurring on that country's soil 
from the period 1946-2005. When a particular conflict was listed as occurring in two or 
more locations, the total deaths for the conflict are divided by the number of locations, 
and each country is allotted the average deaths per location, though this may not 
necessarily reflect the actual distribution of deaths across locations in the conflict (Lacina 
and Gleditsch 2005). 
 
Freedom House Score (FHscore): each country is assigned a numerical rating—on a scale 
of 1 to 7—for political rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 
indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. The two scores 
are combined to make the total freedom house rating. The political rights rating is derived 
from an analysis of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and 
functioning of the government. The civil liberties rating is derived from an analysis of 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House 2009). 
 
Restrictions on Minority Religions (restrMinRel): a composite variable summing up the 
values of 16 different variables that describe the degree of religious discrimination 
against minority religions across a particular dimension. The variable for each particular 
dimension can range from 0 to 3, and so the composite variable can range from 0 to 48. 
The average value of this variable over the years available, between 1990 and 2002, is 
taken. (Fox 2009) 
 
Official Religion (offRel): Coming from Jonathan Fox's Religion and State dataset, the 
variable is coded as:  
0. The State has no official religion 
1. The state has multiple established religions 
2. The state has one established religion 
For our sample of Muslim-majority countries, there are no states with multiple 
established religions, only states with one, Islam, or none.  (Fox 2009). 
 
In Practice How State supports one Religion over another (relgStat): also from Fox 
(2009), this variable measures the extent to which, in practice, a state supports one 
religion over another. This variable is necessary because while Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UK all have official religions, most would agree that the actual preference given to 
certain religions in these states is different. Coded as follows: 
0. No (minority) religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on minority 
religions. 
1. No (minority) religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have practical 
limitations placed upon them or some religions have benefits not given to others due 
to some form of official recognition or status not given to all religions. 
2. No religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have legal limitations 
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placed upon them. 
3. Some (minority) religions are illegal. 
4. All (minority) religions are illegal 
 
Freedom of the Press Rating (freePress): our examination of the level of press freedom in 
each country currently comprises 23 methodology questions divided into three broad 
categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic 
environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points is allotted for a 
more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free 
environment. Each country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers 
indicating less freedom. A country’s final score is based on the total of the three 
categories: A score of 0 to 30 places the country in the Free press group; 31 to 60 in the 
Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group (Freedom House 
2009). 
 
Gender-related Development Index (grdi): calculating the GDI involves three steps.  
Step 1: Unit-free indices between 0 and 1 are calculated for females and males in each of 
the following areas: 
1. life expectancy, 
2. education (the adult literacy rate and the combined primary to tertiary gross enrollment 
ratio), 
3. estimated earned income (at purchasing power parity US$). 
Step 2: For each area, the pair of gender indices are combined into an Equally Distributed 
Index that rewards gender equality and penalizes inequality. It is calculated as the 
harmonic mean of the two indices.  
Equally Distributed index = [(female share of population)/(female-index)+(male share of 
population)/male-index)]^-1 
Step 3: The GDI is the unweighted average of the three Equally Distributed Indices: 
Equally distributed life expectancy index, Equally distributed education index, Equally 
distributed income index.  
 
Adult Literacy Rate Females as a Percentage of Males (litFem): Self-explanatory. The 
rate of female adult literacy divided by the rate of male adult literacy (UNICEF 2009) 
 
Mean age of Marriage of Women (marAge): estimate of the mean age at marriage for a 
given population in a period of time which is derived from the estimation of never-
married women from survey or census data. (United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division (2004) as cited by OECD) 
 
Polygamy: acceptance of polygamy (i.e. the practice of marriage in which a person has 
more than one spouse) within a society (between 0=no and 1=complete acceptance). 
(Lang (1998) as cited by OECD) 
 
Parental Authority (parent): parental authority granted to father and mother equally 






Within the sample of Muslim-majority countries, the links between how explicitly 
“Islamic” a society is, the status of women, and economic and other societal outcomes is 
explored. A country is considered more or less “Islamic” depending upon if Islam is the 
official state religion, if Islamic law forms a basis for the legal system, and the degree to 
which the country has rejected or maintained traditional Islamic norms such as regarding 
the acceptance of polygamy and the legal obligation of women to wear the veil in public. 
It is found that if a country is more “Islamic,” it tends to also have worse outcomes along 
different dimensions, such as degree of authoritarianism and absence of women’s rights. 
However, focusing exclusively on whether the country has Islamic law as a basis of the 
legal system, these countries tend to be richer. An extremity index is composed, which 
contains only variables which describe the status of women in Muslim countries, along 
educational and legal dimensions. It is found in regressions that this extremity index is a 
statistically significant predictor of economic growth, where higher extremity leads to 
lower GDP growth rates. Oil is still an extremely important factor in explaining the 










Numerous researchers have investigated the phenomenon of Islam’s effect on 
economic growth.  Some have concluded that Islam has a negative effect on growth, 
others say it has a positive effect, while others say it has no effect. In general, the results 
have been inconclusive. It is my opinion that most of the studies suffer from a lack of 
nuance. An author attempts to study if Islam has an effect on growth, so she conducts a 
regression trying to explain economic growth with the percentage Muslim in a 
population, focusing on all countries that have at least 20% proportion Muslim. Suppose 
she finds the coefficient on percent Muslim to be insignificantly related to growth. She 
would then conclude that Islam is not a significant causal factor in growth. However, 
there are some flaws in this reasoning. The assumption is made that a country with 99% 
population Muslim, like Tunisia, is “more Islamic” than a country with 88% Muslim, like 
Bangladesh. However, there is no a priori reason to suspect that Islam is a less important 
force in the structuring of society—legally, politically, economically, or even socially—
in a country like Bangladesh as opposed to Tunisia.  Similarly, this reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that two countries with approximately the same percentage Muslim, take 
Turkey (99%) and Iran (99%), are “equally Islamic.” Now, Turkey is a state with a long 
history of a secular tradition upheld in government and society, where the most strongly 
secular force, the military, has even staged several coups over the second half of the 
twentieth century when it felt that the civilian head of state was flirting too much with 
Islamicizing the country. Iran, on the other hand, is a country that experienced a dramatic 
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societal transformation where fundamentalist Islam took an explicitly dominant role 
following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The main point is that there are different 
expressions of Islam that could have markedly different effects on economic outcomes, 
and a researcher who regresses an economic variable on percent Muslim does not 
appreciate this fact. 
What do Westerners think of when they think of Islam? Most must admit that 
some of the images that come immediately to mind are extremist acts, oppression of 
women, and in general backwards societies. However, any Westerners that have Muslim 
friends or acquaintances, or at least try to pay attention to the world around them, must 
acknowledge that these images certainly do not apply to the vast majority of Muslims. 
Moreover, any sensitive observer of the world must attest to the fact that within any 
religion, there is large variation in terms of expression, degree of adherence, views of the 
infallibility of the original texts, and interpretations of important points. This is true in all 
religions. One might call himself Catholic, but not attend Mass but once a year, not pray 
or read the Bible ever, and not believe the Bible to be the word of God. One might call 
himself Muslim, but likewise be very lax in his practice, and more secular-minded in his 
perspective of the Quran. Another might be very strict with his daily routine, very devout, 
and orthodox in his beliefs.  
Like any major religion, Islam has numerous different schools of thought and 
countless variability in local expressions. However, I feel there are broad distinctions that 
can be made. One might call a Muslim who believes that all women should be covered 
head-to-toe “fundamentalist” or “backwards,” whereas others might call him “old-
fashioned” or even “orthodox.” On the other hand, a Muslim who is proud to see a 
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woman as head of state in his own country could be called “liberal” or “modern.” This of 
course runs the risk of oversimplification, as a Muslim might believe that the hijab (just 
the head covering) is a religious requirement for women, yet be supportive of female 
political participation (this could describe many people in Turkey). However, I think the 
idea that the spectrum of different expressions of Islam falling along a line from “old-
fashioned” to “modern” is useful and describes the reality of different people’s tendencies 
and beliefs. I also believe it could be useful to classify whole societies.  
In this paper, I use what I call an “extremity index” to summarize where a 
particular country falls on the range of moderate/liberal to backwards/extreme. This 
measure is a weighted average of different variables which I considered to be acceptable 
proxies for how “old-fashioned” the expression of Islam in the country is. Various 
variables were tried, where the two final indexes consist of measures of the gender gap in 
education, a measure of the obligation of women to wear the veil in public within the 
country, and a measure of the difficulty for women to obtain land, loans, and other 
property. Other measures are explored in the descriptive statistics section that serve as 
demonstrations to how extremity along certain dimensions relate to extremity along other 
dimensions.  
An important input into the different formulations of the extremity index is the 
difference between the total percent of students enrolled in secondary school who are 
girls and the percentage of girls who are under 15 in the population. I feel this is a good 
measure because the belief that boys should be given priority in education because the 
girls will not need it when they are older is widely regarded as an outdated idea. In 
addition, Islam is widely regarded, at least in the eyes of most Westerners, to be a 
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religion that at least in its most fundamentalist form is repressive of women to some 
degree. Therefore, a Muslim society that tends to have a lower percentage of girls 
enrolled in secondary school will be viewed as a more “old-fashioned,” less 
“progressive” expression of Islam. I will call this measure “measure of discrimination of 
girls,” though this is an imperfect descriptor. Some of the societies that have a lower 
percentage enrolled are not necessarily discriminating against girls. Perhaps it is a truly 
practical consideration which results in the lower percentage. However, this variable is 
linked with other forms of bias against women, which cannot be justified economically. 
There is some good evidence to support the notion that variation in gender 
equality in education can directly explain some of the variation in economic growth rates 
across countries. This will be addressed below, but this paper takes the stance that the 
gender inequality measure, coupled with the other discrimination against females 
measures is a proxy for something deeper, and that the significant explanatory power of 
gender inequality in growth regressions in this sample of Muslim countries is not fully 
due to the direct causal affect of gender inequality on economic growth, but rather the 
measure is a proxy for the “expression of Islam” dominant in the country. First, it should 
be demonstrated that this measure is adequate to proxy for a broader and much less 
observable quality, the “expression of Islam” in a country; i.e. that a higher level of 
gender discrimination implies a more “old-fashioned” expression of Islam. Second, it 
should be demonstrated that this “old-fashioned” Islam could be an inhibiting factor on 
growth.  
First, I will address the issue of the status of women in the Islamic world before 
the most transformative European encroachment in the 19th century and onwards. Leila 
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Ahmed, in her book Women and Gender in Islam (1992), provides a thorough account of 
this issue, of which I will give a few relevant facts and thoughts. Ahmed describes how 
the scholarly establishment has hailed the documentary evidence showing that women in 
the medieval Islamic world inherited and owned property and pursued their economic 
interests, even in court. But she emphasizes that women were active within very limited 
parameters permitted by their society, limited to acquiring property essentially through 
gift or inheritance, whereas areas of the economy in which wealth might be aggressively 
acquired were by and large closed to women (pp. 111-112).This supports the idea that 
access to land, loans, and other property may be a good proxy for the degree of old-
fashioned-ness of the expression of Islam in society.   
She describes the legacy of the conglomeration of the authoritative texts in the 
period of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties (the rulers of the Islamic world after the 
early period of Muhammed and his first few successors): 
In sum, then, the moment in which Islamic law and scriptural interpretation were 
elaborated and cast into the forms considered authoritative to our own day was a 
singularly unpropitious one for women. The heritage of the Umayyad and in 
particular the Abbasid society played a significant part in determining the extent 
to which the elaboration of the law would be weighted against them. (p. 100) 
It seems clear to me that the status of women in medieval Islam was low. As Europe 
became more and more important in the cultural and political life of Middle Eastern 
Muslims, a social transformation in gender issues was occurring. Ahmed writes that the 
influence of Europe was on the whole a great advance for women: 
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[…] in crucial ways the outcome of the process of change the [European political 
and cultural] encroachments set in motion was broadly positive, because the 
social institutions and mechanisms for the control and seclusion of women and for 
their exclusion from the major domains of activity in their society were gradually 
dismantled. The social system had combined the worst features of a 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern misogyny with an Islam interpreted in the 
most negative way possible for women, and Middle Eastern women have no 
cause to regret its passing. (p. 128) 
She describes how the transformations took place with varying degrees in various places 
and at various times: 
The direction of change was similar for the Middle East as a whole, though the 
pace of change differed from country to country. Egypt and Turkey and to a lesser 
extent Syria, where European products first entered the market, were in the 
vanguard, whereas the Arabian Peninsula was less directly affected until well into 
the twentieth century (p 129-130). 
Hence, the European influence differed throughout the region, which would explain part 
of the reason why one society might condone the presence of women in any place in the 
workforce, whereas another might restrict women to very narrow spheres (of course 
European influence is not the only factor, and individual country historical and social 
developments matter).  
So we can see that European encroachment had a dramatic transformative effect 
on Middle Eastern society, and affected the lot of women in addition. Also, it affected 
different places in varying degrees. Ahmed also gives a telling account of how European 
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influence led to education for women. She describes how the Islamic world’s desire to 
“catch-up”, led by the state’s aggressive pursuit of educational modernization and 
technological and social reform had enormous and enduring consequences for women (p. 
134). In many lands, the state promulgated women’s education, and men who were 
educated in the “modern” schools or who traveled to Europe to study called for reforms 
in the social arrangements regarding women. Muhammad ‘Ali, the viceroy of Egypt in 
the first half of the 19th century eagerly sought to strengthen his country militarily and 
technologically and catch up with Europe, sending student missions to Europe to learn 
military and engineering sciences. Al-Tahtawi, a director of a translating school in Cairo  
recommended that girls be given the same education as boys, saying that this was 
the practice in the strongest nations, that is, in European ones. His was the first 
work to appear in Arabic associating reforms in social mores affecting women 
with the social and technological reforms for national renewal. Muhammad ‘Ali 
much admired al-Tahtawi’s book and recommended its general use with students. 
Shortly thereafter the state, at least rhetorically, adopted the view that educating 
women was desirable (p. 134).  
Now I have rounded out the first part of my argument, that the degree of modernization 
of an Islamic country can be correlated with the degree of female equality in education 
and the degree of women’s rights in other spheres, such as regarding the ability for 
women to obtain land, loans, and other property. In general, the degree to which a society 
has rejected an older Islamic norm such as male-biased inheritance, or the obligation to 
wear the veil in public, can be regarded as a measure of how “modern” the expression of 
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Islam is in the country. Now I will describe how an “old-fashioned” type of Islam could 
be inhibitory to economic growth. 
One way in which “old-fashioned” Islam may inhibit growth is through a disdain 
for foreigners, and especially the West. Timur Kuran, economist and Islamic economics 
scholar, writes that Islamic norms require Muslims to limit, if not shun, economic 
relations with non-Muslims, even with nonconformist Muslims (2004). Of course there 
are many economic relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims across the world, 
but some of the more fundamentalist Muslim leaders seem to discourage 
interrelationships with the West. Mawdudi, an influential Pakistani Islamist leader of the 
mid-twentieth century, and one of the founders of what would be called “Islamic 
economics,” blamed Western influence for domestic problems as he criticized some of 
his countrymen, claiming that being brainwashed to think like Westerners, the 
nationalists were trying to refashion Islam in the image of irreligious Western 
materialism (Kuran 85).  
A disdain for anything Western may cause powerful Islamist policymakers in the 
Muslim world to promote isolationist economic paths which hinder growth. After the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, the leaders of the new Republic nationalized banking because 
they felt that, in the pursuit of profits, the private owners of the banks used their financial 
resources for unproductive projects that were against the will and interest of the public 
(Zangeneh and Salam). Total credit fell during the first 10 years of the Revolution, which 
probably contributed to the overall economic decline experienced after the Revolution. 
More pertinent to the idea of anti-foreign sentiment, the percentage of credit devoted to 
international trade fell from 10.2 percent of the total in 1977, to only 0.8 percent in 1987. 
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Since there is good evidence that trade openness positively affects growth, a closed-off 
economic stance could be another drag on growth.  
On the other hand, some Muslim-majority countries in Asia have done very well 
economically over all, particularly Malaysia (Noland and Pack). Both have relied heavily 
on Chinese expertise in entrepreneurship and their extensive international marketing and 
financial networks, but despite considerable success, there is still great unease with the 
Chinese minority, and government policies are undertaken to placate the majority. This 
example illustrates that there is much to be gained economically when Muslim leaders 
open their economy and let foreigners bring to the Table what they have to offer, and it 
illustrates that a large portion of Muslims still harbor disdain of the foreign presence and 
can influence policy to close off the economy to the disadvantage of the economy as a 
whole. 
Xenophobia is not unique to the Muslim world. It is a problem to a greater or 
lesser extent in most regions of the globe, including the rich industrialized nations. 
However, with in the Muslim world, the most ardently anti-Western countries would tend 
to be the most “old-fashioned” in their interpretation of Islam, and plausibly the most 
backwards in their approach to gender equality. This means that this old-fashioned Islam 
could adversely affect Muslim economies not merely through the lower quantity of 
human capital through gender discrimination in schooling, but also through the proven-
to-be detrimental effect of isolating one’s economy from the outside world.  
Another reason expressions of Islam that are “old-fashioned” might tend to 
decrease the economic prosperity of a nation arises from the history of the founding and 
spread of Islam. It is related to the way in which Muslim leaders and peoples acquired 
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their wealth in their early history, relying to a large extent on conquest. Ibn Khaldun, a 
famous 14th century Muslim thinker, gave a theory to explain the flowering and decay of 
Muslim states. Khaldun’s theory and an explanation are put forth well by Islamic 
economics scholar Timur Kuran: 
Ibn Khaldun observed that Muslim states were typically founded by nomadic 
warriors motivated by the promise of booty and glory. The warriors would 
subjugate, unite, and organize sedentary populations, then settle down themselves. 
Their descendants, raised in calm and comfort, would possess neither the 
predatory urges nor the dynamism that led to their state’s creation. Content to 
preserve their gains, they would make their states vulnerable to conquest by a 
fresh band of ambitious nomads prepared to work for a more advanced 
socioeconomic order. In Ibn Khaldun’s account, then, the main source of 
economic progress is conquest motivated by looting; without conquest, states 
would only decay, because they lack an internal engine for change. The religious 
connection comes from the legitimacy that Islam has bestowed upon conquest. 
Not only did conquest play an important role in the first Islamic state’s expansion 
but the fundamental sources of Islam justify its use in promoting conversions. 
Insofar as the emphasis on conquest discouraged the creation of new wealth, 
religion would have restrained intensive economic growth. At the time Ibn 
Khaldun wrote, the Islamic world was more than two centuries away from the 
peak of its European expansion. It is amazing, therefore, that he worried about the 
decline of scientific learning in Muslim countries and that he expressed 
admiration for philosophical advances in “the land of Rome.” Evidently, he 
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sensed that an internal engine of economic development would ultimately 
outperform an external one based on conquest. (Kuran) 
Interestingly, later on the Ottoman rulers, aware of a rising Europe and a declining 
Empire, judged that the West’s increasing dominance was derived entirely from superior 
weaponry (Kuran). They did not grasp that there was a strong economic engine that 
under-girded all of these innovations (Kuran). Therefore I see much interest in the 
weaponry of Europe from the Ottomans, but practically no interest in the methods of 
commerce and trade of Europe (Kuran).  
We see now some historical reasons why the Islamic world has lagged behind the 
West for hundreds of years. Some of these may include an exclusion of women from 
society, an undue appreciation for the use of conquest to acquire wealth, and a lack of 
interest in foreign economic and technological innovations outside of weaponry.  (The 
reasons are much more complex than this, and Kuran (2004) is a good source for 
understanding some of the historical developments that have led to the economic 
underperformance of the Islamic world relative to the West). I also have noted some of 
the economically beneficial effects experienced by Muslim nations by opening their 
societies to Western influences, especially opening their societies to the idea that women 
should be educated as well as men. In addition, we have seen evidence that—for various 
historical reasons—nations received varying levels of exposure to these influences. Also, 
different attitudes towards the West persist in different countries, and some of the more 
extreme “expressions of Islam” tend to harbor strong anti-Western sentiments which 
could negatively affect their economic well-being. These findings indicate that the level 
of discrimination against women in various areas could be a useful proxy for the “type of 
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Islam” dominant in a country. Before proceeding to the results of the statistical study I 
conducted, I should review the relevant literature about Islam and economic growth, and 






Islam and Economic Growth Literature 
Much has been written on the topic of Islam’s relation to economic prosperity. A 
valuable resource to understand the argument that Islam inhibits economic growth is 
Hillman (2007). He presents statistics comparing the economic status of Muslim 
countries with their non-Muslim neighbors, demonstrating that the Muslim countries on 
the whole tend to under-perform their non-Muslim neighbors. He also writes that radical 
Islam tends to value the spread of Islam and the re-conquest of formerly Muslim lands at 
the expense of economic progress. He notes that  
In contemporary times, not all Islamic rulers and states actively abide by the 
supreme values. To do so would require an ongoing active state of war against 
non-Islamic societies. Radical Islam does, however, actively seek the priority 
supreme-value objectives. 
In a vein of work similar to this paper, he distinguishes between radical Islam and non-
radical, seeking to explore the effect of radical Islam on own populations. He notes that 
oil wealth is an important pre-requisite for relative affluence in the Middle East, and that 
of the non-oil countries, those with explicitly secular governmental frameworks and/or 
significant non-Muslim minorities (Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon) have higher incomes. 
In contrast to works that emphasize the growth-inhibiting quality of authentic 
Islam, Askari and Taghavi (2005) argue that Islam, being the only major religion that 
imparts detailed prescriptions for the economic life of its followers, prescribes guidelines 
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that if followed correctly will lead to economically prosperous and just societies. They 
use the Quran and other foundational texts of Islam in an attempt to demonstrate that 
such good qualities as pluralistic democracies, economic prosperity and growth, 
employment, and education are societal requirements placed upon leaders in Muslim 
lands, and that the paucity of these qualities in Muslim lands reflects the shortcomings of 
state authorities and their interests in maintaining the political status quo, not any 
shortcoming in Islam as a religion. My paper will not explore in-depth the relevant 
passages in the Quran or Hadith to investigate this view. Rather, it will take various 
indicators of a more “old-fashioned” type of Islam and investigate the link between those 
indicators and growth. 
Helble (2007) explores “Is God good for trade?” and cites historical reasons to 
believe that Islam would be conducive to international trade, with his hypothesis verified 
in contemporary statistics, according to his model.   
An interesting paper exploring the effects of Islam on a developing country’s 
economic institutions and performance is Pryor (2006). He uses the percentage of 
Muslims in each country as a proxy variable for the influence of Islam in that country. 
(Above, I argued that this is not an accurate proxy for the influence of Islam in a 
country.) He notes that though Muslim countries tend to be poorer than the world 
average, they are not poorer amongst the set of developing countries; i.e. they are not the 
poorest of the poor. He writes that though some have argued that in Islam there is no 
“separation of mosque and state,” few current Muslim states have featured the type of 
theocratic government implied by this statement, other than Iran and Taliban 
Afghanistan. However, I think this statement hides the fact that these are not the only two 
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countries where classical Islamic texts play a significant role in the legal system, and that 
just because a theocratic-style government does not prevail in a country, it does not mean 
that the laws and institutions are fully secular. However, his observations that “in many 
nominally Muslim countries, religious injunctions are not incorporated into economic 
institutions or governmental policies” (p. 1817) and “some doctrines are obeyed only in 
form (but not in content) or are simply disregarded” (pp. 1817 – 1818) are important, and 
are foundational ideas to this paper. He argues that induction ought to be preferred over 
deduction in gauging the effect of Islam. He reasons that an argument based on the tenets 
and doctrines of Islam will encounter problems, due to the above facts of variation in 
adherence and in application to societal structure. The greatest innovation in his paper is 
the use of cluster analysis to explore the possibility that Islamic countries can be grouped 
together in an economic institutional system. He finds that this is not the case.  
The main innovation in this paper is that like Pryor I use an inductive, rather than 
purely deductive, approach to exploring the effect of Islam on growth, but for my proxy 
of the effect of Islam on society I use various cultural indicators related to the status of 
women and the influence of Islam in the legal system of the country. 
Gender Inequality and Economic Growth Literature 
 There has been thorough analysis conducted on the issue of the relationship 
between gender inequality in education and economic growth. The main finding is that 
gender inequality in education is correlated with lower growth rates, above and beyond 
the direct effect of the reduction in human capital from educating females less.  Countries 
with equal average years of schooling for the whole population will tend to have lower 
growth rates and lower incomes if they have higher gender inequality. 
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 There are good theoretical reasons brought out in papers on this subject for why I 
would see this correlation. Authors of papers on this subject note the economic channels 
through which the lower growth could result, (1) lower average human capital on the 
whole; (2) less educated mothers can mean less educated and capable children, since 
children often spend a greater time with their mother than with their father in their 
childhood.  
 These theoretical channels seem legitimate to me; however, I do not believe that 
they explain fully the correlation observed between economic growth and gender equality 
observed in my sample of Muslim countries.  The historical account given concerning the 
European encroachment and its effects on women’s education provides evidence for the 
idea that the gender equality measure can also be used as a proxy for degree of historical 
openness to the West and degree of modern-ness of Islam in the country.  
 Dollar and Gatti (1999) note that “It is possible that income affects gender 
inequality; that gender inequality affects growth and hence income; or both. Or, it may 
simply be that common underlying factors determine both income and gender inequality” 
(p. 1).  This paper takes the stance that there are common underlying factors determining 
both income and gender inequality in the sample of Muslim countries, and that the 
common underlying factor is the specific religious/cultural preference of those who hold 
power in these countries.  
 Dollar and Gatti write, “The econometric evidence suggests that societies have to 
pay a price for gender inequality in terms of slower growth. However, the fact that 
religion variables systematically explain differences in gender inequality suggests that 
some societies have a preference for inequality and are willing to pay a price for it. (It 
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would perhaps be more accurate to say that those who control resources in the society 
have a preference for gender inequality that they are willing to pay for.)” (p. 3). They find 
that high female attainment is associated with Protestant Christianity and that low 
achievement is associated with the Muslim and Hindu religions (p. 12). In their study, the 
religious variables used as independent variables to explain gender inequality indicate the 
share of the population that follows a particular religion. For reasons cited above, this 
may not be the best approach to gauge the effect of Islam.  
 Lagerlof (2003) argues that the economic and demographic development in 
Europe over the last couple of millennia is related to long-term changes in gender 
equality. He argues that the spread of Christianity led to the increase in gender equality, 
giving the example that, “beginning in Roman times, Christians allowed women to hold 
positions within the Church, improved the treatment of widows, and extended women’s 
rights to inherit and hold property”. He develops a model where greater gender equality 
gradually leads to increases in per capita income, increases in population growth rate, 
further increases in gender equality, and eventually a decrease in population growth rate. 
It is a premise of this paper that variation in European influence within the Islamic world, 
which through Christianity is linked with greater gender equality and other positive social 
developments, such as respect for human rights and accountability of the rulers to the 






 In this section, I present descriptive statistics to paint a picture of the different 
kinds of countries in the Muslim world. We are interested in the relationships between 
variables which indicate: the situation for women, being unequal and repressive or fair 
and accommodating; the role of Islam in the state, explicitly Islamic or not; how 
Europeanized are norms related to gender (polygamy, male-biased inheritance); how free 
and democratic is the society; how are minority religions treated; and how all of these 
variables relate to level of income, and more broadly, economic development as 
measured by HDI. Correlations are described below, and then in the next section I divide 
the sample into categories by whether the country is “high”, “medium”, or “low” along a 
particular variable. I then take each of the three groups and take means for the other 
variables within each group and see how the levels of the other variables compare across 
the “high”, “medium,” and “low” group.  When examining the descriptive statistics, it 
will be helpful to remember that the variables related to societal/institutional treatment of 
women, such as the variables called polygamy, parental, inheritance, violWom, 
missWom, freeMoveWom, veil, and landLoanProp are all coded on a scale of 0 to 1, 
where 1 is the “least modern” or in many cases unequivocally the most weighted against 
women. For examples, missing women is 1 if there are more missing women in this 
country than any in the sample, and 0 if there are as many women as men in the country; 
veil is 1 if there is complete obligation to wear the veil in public in the country, and 0 if 





 In this section, I present the correlations of a particular variable of interest with 
other variables, in order to portray a picture of what characteristics are associated with 
other characteristics in the sample of Muslim-majority countries. 
Institutions Related to Gender and Other Variables We Care About 
Table 1: The correlation of the veil variable (full obligation to wear the veil in public = 1, no obligation = 
0) and other variables we care about. 
FHscore  FHcl  restrMinRel  offRel  freePress  sharia 
0.37**  0.39**  0.55***  0.35*  0.33*  0.47*** 
           
polygamy  inherit  miss  freeMov  land  prop 
0.38**  0.45**  0.59***  0.67***  0.46**  0.36** 
 
Table 1 reveals that obligation to wear the veil in public is associated with less 
freedom as measured by freedom house and less freedom of the press, more restrictions 
on minority religions, more likely to have Islam as the official state religion as opposed to 
no official religion, more likely to have Sharia, greater acceptance of polygamy, more 
male-biased inheritance, greater number of missing women, greater restrictions on the 
free movement of women, and less access for women to land and other property. 
Table 2: The correlations of the measure of female discrimination in secondary school with other 
variables. 
hdi90  hdi95  hdi00  hdi06  birth  cgdp70  corrupt  restrMin  offRel 
‐0.56**  ‐0.64***  ‐0.74***  ‐0.79***  0.79***  ‐0.34**  ‐0.46***  ‐0.28*  ‐0.28* 
                 
grdi  litFem  primEd  secEdu  marAge  polyg.  land  loan  prop 




From Table 2, one can see that greater discrimination of females in secondary 
school is associated with lower hdi, higher birthrates, lower GDP, greater corruption, 
more restrictions on minority religions, more likely to have Islam as official state 
religion, poorer educational outcomes for women measured with other variables, greater 
acceptance of polygamy, and less access to land, loan, and other property for women. 
Table 3: The correlations of the difficulty for women of obtaining land with other variables. 
hdi00  hdi06  birth  grdi  litFem  islamLaw  primEd  secEdu  marAge 
‐0.6***  ‐0.45**  0.62***  ‐0.44**  ‐0.32*  ‐0.36*  ‐0.49**  ‐0.37*  ‐0.65*** 
                 
polygamy  freeMov  veil  loan  femDisc  cgdp80  cgdp00  cgdp07  gdp70‐07 
0.44**  0.58***  0.46**  0.46**  0.41**  ‐0.35*  ‐0.47***  ‐0.43**  ‐0.4** 
 
From Table 3, one can see that difficulty in obtaining land for women is 
associated with lower hdi, higher birthrate, lower gender-related development index, 
lower literacy rate for females, fewer instances of Islam being mentioned as a basis of the 
legal system, fewer girls relative to boys in school, lower marriage age, greater 
acceptance of polygamy, greater restrictions on the free movement of women, more 
obligation to wear the veil in public, less access to loans for women, and lower GDP. The 
variable describing the difficulty for women to obtain loans has correlations that are quite 
similar to the above, with the addition that more difficulty for this variable is associated 
with  greater corruption. 
Table 4: the correlation of the average real GDP from 1970 to 2007 with variables related to gender. 
birth  litFem  primEdu  secEdu  marAge  loan  prop  femDisc 
‐0.39***  0.5***  0.34**  0.29*  0.44***  ‐0.4**  ‐0.43**  ‐0.36** 
 
From the correlations in Table 4, one can see a few patterns emerging. First, there 
are a few gender-related variables that correlate significantly with GDP levels over the 
time period. These variables fall into the categories of education; marriage age; access to 
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land, loans or property for women; and birthrate. These variables correlate in the 
directions that I would expect. That is, those countries that tend to have greater equality 
across gender in education and in access to land, loans and property, and those having a 
higher average marrying age and a lower average birthrate, tend to be richer. The 
marriage age and birthrate categories need to be understood in the context of “correlation 
does not imply causation,” as does the education category: increased economic 
opportunities in an economy as a whole could increase the relative value of participation 
in the workforce over pure work within the home for women. But correlations concerning 
the access to land, loans and property for women and GDP show something noteworthy. 
It shows that a country whose access to land, loans and property for women is lower 
tends to have a lower GDP. It is certainly possible that less access for women could cause 
lower average productivity for the population, but I theorize that these particular 
institutional indicators can be thought of as proxies for a broader shaping of society as a 
whole. This idea is verified in the observation, seen in Table 5, that out of the 12 
institutional indicators that are related to gender--of which some are arguably linked to 
Islam--the variables that have statistically significant correlations one with another are all 
correlated in the “correct direction.” That is, when one variable, such as women’s access 
to loans, indicates a male-bias or a more old-fashioned kind of Islam, another variable, 
such as obligation to wear the veil in public, will tend to fall in the same direction. That 
is, women tend to be obliged to wear the veil in public in places where they tend to have 
less access to loans. Though not all of the correlations between all of these variables are 




  marAge  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  land  loan 
parental  ‐0.3  1               
inherit  0.1  0.43**  1             
Viol  ‐0.03  0.06  0.07  1           
Miss  0.04  0.21  0.3  0.11  1         
freeMov  ‐0.27  0.22  0.23  0.14  0.53**  1       
Veil  ‐0.3  0.14  0.45**  0.29  0.59***  0.67***  1     
Land  ‐0.65***  0.14  0.08  0.11  ‐0.11  0.58***  0.46**  1   
Loan  ‐0.46**  0.18  0.08  0.1  ‐0.03  0.48***  0.2  0.46**  1 
Prop  ‐0.51***  0.07  0.28  0  ‐0.17  0.36*  0.36**  0.61***  0.78*** 
 
And though not all of the indicators are individually significant with respect to 
GDP levels, e.g. the veil variable and GDP do not significantly correlate, since the only 
institutional indicators in this category that are significantly related to GDP are related in 
the “correct direction,” I argue that this category of indicators is relevant to understanding 
the variation between the GDP levels of these Muslim countries.  
Authoritarianism 
Islam means “submission” (to God), and Muslim literally means “one who submits.” 
Some scholars have argued that Islam is conducive to authoritarian government. The 
historical and textual arguments for this idea are the subject of debate outside of the 
scope of this paper. However, in our sample of Muslim-majority countries, the countries 
that give Islam a more explicitly prominent role in their governmental system tend to be 
more authoritarian. This can be seen in Table 6 below, where the countries with Islam as 
their official religion tend to be more authoritarian than those that have no official 
religion, as do the countries with Islam as part of the basis for their legal system relative 
to those that do not have Islam as a legal basis, and the countries that specifically practice 
Sharia law are more authoritarian than those that do not. Higher authoritarianism is also 
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found with higher acceptance of polygamy; male-biased inheritance; obligation to wear 
the veil (only at the 0.12 level); and lower GDP.  These correlations taken together 
suggest that a more explicitly “Islamic” Muslim country may be more authoritarian and 
also poorer. Tables 7-9, which are based on Freedom House’s political rights and civil 
liberties rating, and their freedom of the press rating, give further evidence that less 
freedom in a society is correlated with more “Islamic” countries. 
Table 6: the correlations of the average Polity score from 1970 to 2007 with other variables. A higher 
score means more democratic; a lower score means more authoritarian. 
hdi06  FHscore  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  freePress  grdi  islamLaw  Sharia 
‐0.29*  ‐0.6***  ‐0.35**  ‐0.36**  ‐0.26*  ‐0.52***  ‐0.29*  ‐0.44***  ‐0.28* 
               
polygamy  inheritance  violWom  cgdp00  cgdp07  GDP70‐07 






hdi90  hdi95  hdi00  hdi06  FHscore  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  freePress 
‐0.43*  ‐0.41*  ‐0.35*  ‐0.34**  ‐0.72***  ‐0.36**  ‐0.35**  ‐0.23  ‐0.61*** 
               
grdi  islamLaw  Sharia  polygamy  inheritance  cgdp00  cgdp07  GDP70‐07 




corrupt  Polity90s  Polity00s  restrMinRel  offRel  islamLaw 
‐0.26*  ‐0.56***  ‐0.78***  0.35**  0.29*  0.46*** 
           
sharia  parent  inherit  freeMov  veil   






hdi90  hdi00  corrupt  Polity90s  Polity00s  restrMinRel 
0.57***  0.36*  ‐0.28*  ‐0.49***  ‐0.64***  0.22 
           
grdi  islamLaw  Sharia  inherit  veil 





hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  cgdp70  battleD  FHscore  offRel  freePress  grdi 
0.57***  ‐0.41***  0.33**  0.59***  ‐0.32**  ‐0.26*  0.32**  ‐0.28*  0.53*** 
                 
litFem  secEdu  marAge  loan  prop  femDisc  cgdp80  cgdp07  gdp70‐07 
0.46***  0.34**  0.45***  ‐0.45**  ‐0.39**  ‐0.46***  0.63***  0.68***  0.66*** 
Corruption is significantly related to GDP levels. It could be interesting to see if 
any variables arguably linked to Islam are significantly correlated to corruption levels. 
From Table 10, one can see that less corruption is linked with: lower birthrate; fewer 
battle deaths; Islam as official state religion as opposed to none; greater score on gender-
related development index; larger proportion of female literacy as a proportion of male 
literacy; larger proportion of females in primary and secondary education; higher 
marrying age; more access for women with regards to loans and property other than land; 
and of course higher GDP levels.  It is interesting to note that GDP growth from 1990 to 
1999 is significantly related to corruption in the expected direction, but growth from 2000 
to 2007 is not significantly related. This is possibly due to the boom in oil prices in the 
2000s dominating the determinants of growth in the sample and consequently “washing 
out” the effects of other important institutional variables. This phenomenon will prove as 
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an important explanation for the strength and then weakness of the extremity indexes in 
explaining growth in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively.  
Battle deaths 
Table 11: the correlations of number of battle deaths with other variables. 
corrupt  restrMinRel  offRel  sharia  primEd  secEdu  viol  miss 
‐0.32**  0.36**  0.25  0.38**  ‐0.42**  ‐0.27  0.45***  0.58*** 
 
Battle deaths upon own soil is used as a proxy for how conflict-prone the country 
is, though this is an oversimplified interpretation of this variable, since battle deaths on 
own soil may not reflect that country’s tendency to fight or begin conflicts, but could 
reflect the belligerence of another country involved if the conflict is an interstate conflict. 
However, I will use this as an imperfect proxy. Islam spread with the sword originally. 
Given Islamic fanaticism is strongly associated with violence in many Muslim countries, 
I see the  measurement of degree of conflict as a proxy for “type of Islam,” where the 
Muslim countries with the most violence over recent history would be seen as the more 
“old-fashioned,” traditional, or extreme type of Islam1.  
According to Table 11, a higher number of battle deaths in our sample of Muslim 
countries tends to be associated with: more corruption; greater number of restrictions on 
minority religions; more likely to have official state religion(s) (0.12 level); more likely 
for minority religions to have legal limitations placed upon them or be entirely illegal 
                                                
 
 
1 It is worth noting that Arabs and Muslims trace their literal and spiritual ancestry, respectively, to 
Abraham through Ishmael and the bible states that Ishmael would be a father of a great nation and “shall be 
a wild [donkey] of a man, his hand against every man and every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell 
over against all his kinsmen,”(Genesis 16:11-12 RSV), meaning that the nation that comes from Ishmael 
will be involved in a lot of conflict. 
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(0.12 level); more likely to practice Sharia; fewer girls in primary school (and secondary 
at 0.12 level) compared to boys; deficiency in laws against violence against women; and 
more “missing women” (generally due to preferential treatment given to boys at birth and 
in childrearing).  
Restrictions on minority religions 
Table 12: the correlations with the measure of restrictions on minority religions and other variables. 
relFrac  hdi06  birth  grdi  litFem  islamLaw  Sharia  secEdu  marAge 
‐0.31**  0.45***  ‐0.37**  0.4**  0.31**  0.48***  0.46***  0.27*  0.28* 
                 
viol  miss  veil  Gr90‐07  polity70‐07  femDisc  cgdp00  cgdp07  gdp70‐07 
0.36**  0.38**  0.55***  0.29*  ‐0.35**  ‐0.28*  0.33**  0.33**  0.32** 
Historically, when Islam has dominated in a society, life has not always been easy 
for members of minority religions (see “Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam” for a 
historical treatment of the topic). And in the modern day, members of minority religions 
in Muslim countries do suffer persecution in many places and sometimes at extremely 
severe levels. Let us explore the correlates of Jonathan Fox’s catch-all “restrictions on 
minority religions” variable within our sample, examining Table 12. Greater restrictions 
on minority religions tend to be correlated with: lower religious fractionalization (this 
could be because where there is a greater presence of minority religions, it will be more 
difficult to legislate against them, or it could be because in less tolerant lands, there is 
more pressure to convert to the main religion); higher hdi (this could be because there are 
several relatively rich and developed countries that have severe restrictions on minority 
religions); lower birthrate (for same reason as before); higher grdi (high hdi will be 
correlated with high grdi); greater female literacy; more likely to have Islam mentioned 
as a basis for legal system; more likely to have Sharia; more females in secondary 
education; higher marriage age; greater deficiency in laws protecting women against 
27 
 
violence; more “missing women”; less free movement of women allowed (at 0.12 level); 
women more likely to be obligated to wear the veil in public; higher growth over 90 to 
07; more authoritarian in governance; higher levels of GDP. So what basically seems to 
be going on here is that the countries that tend to place more restrictions on minority 
religions are rich countries that have a few better gender-equality statistics due to their 
economic development, but still are “backwards” in many respects concerning the 
treatment of their women, are authoritarian in their style of governance, and explicitly 
Islamic in their legal system. The countries with above average number of restrictions (11 
or greater) export on average about 1 million barrels of oil per day, while the countries 
that have below average restrictions export on average about one-quarter million barrels 
of oil per day. This could explain the differences in levels of income; hence hdi; hence 




relFrac  hdi06  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  grdi 
‐0.35**  0.42***  0.32**  ‐0.30*  ‐0.29*  ‐0.39***  0.25  0.29*  0.42** 
                 
secEdu  marrAge  inherit  miss  veil  femDisc  cgdp00  cgdp07  gdp70‐07 
0.38**  0.54***  0.53***  0.6***  0.35*  ‐0.28*  0.39***  0.34**  0.37** 
From Table 13, one sees that having Islam as the official religion in a state 
corresponds to having better economic outcomes, less corruption, and a more modernized 
situation for women along certain dimensions (greater opportunities for education, higher 
marrying age); however, these places also tend to be more authoritarian, have less 
freedom in the society overall, have male-biased inheritance, more missing women, and 
the obligation to wear the veil in public. 
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Islamic law and Sharia 
Table 14: the correlations between having Islam mentioned as a basis for the legal system and other 
variables. 
hdi95  hdi06  corrupt  FHscore  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  freePress  grdi 
0.52**  0.38**  0.25*  0.46***  0.48***  0.69***  0.41***  0.33**  0.3* 
                 
sharia  secEdu  marAge  inherit  miss  land  polity70.07  Polity90.07  gdp70.07 
0.3**  0.34**  0.54***  0.52***  0.49***  ‐0.36*  ‐0.44***  ‐0.54***  0.35** 
The CIA world factbook contains statistics on legal systems around the world (as 
cited by Nationmaster). If Islam was specifically mentioned as a basis for the legal 
system, then the country received a 1 for this variable, else zero. If “Sharia” was 
specifically mentioned, then the country received a 1 for this variable; else zero. From 
Table 14, one sees that the mention of Islam as a basis for the legal system tends to be 
associated with: higher hdi and higher GDP; less corruption; more authoritarianism; less 
freedom (according to freedom house score and freedom of press ratings); more 
restrictions on minority religions; more likely to have one official religion; more likely to 
have minority religions have legal limitations or be illegal (relgStat variable); higher 
gender-related development index; more girls in secondary school; higher marriage age; 
more male-biased inheritance; more missing women; and women have better access to 
land (wrong direction).  
Table 15: the correlation of Sharia mentioned as practiced and other variables. 
hdi06  battDeath  FHscore  restrMinRel  offRel  RelStat  freePress  grdi 
0.3*  0.38**  0.27*  0.46***  0.34**  0.34**  0.26*  0.26 
               
islamLaw  viol  miss  veil  polity70‐07  polity90‐07  gdp70‐07 
0.3**  0.4**  0.46**  0.47***  ‐0.28*  ‐0.29*  0.37** 
From Table 15, one sees that the mention of Sharia is correlated with: higher hdi 
and higher GDP; more authoritarianism; more battle deaths; less freedom (according to 
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Freedom House score and freedom of press rating); more restrictions on minority 
religions; more likely to have Islam as the official state religion; more likely to have legal 
limitations on minority religions or minority religions are illegal; a greater deficiency of 
laws protecting women against violence; more missing women; and more obligation for 
women to wear veil in public. It is interesting that a higher number of battle deaths is 
associated with both having Islam as the official state religion and with having Sharia 
law. One would certainly think of a place where Sharia law is practiced as being a more 
“old-fashioned” Islamic society. Since these places tend to have more battle deaths on 
own soil, it lends credence to the idea that the (spiritual and physical) descendants of 
Ishmael would “be a wild donkey of a man, his hand against every man and every man's 
hand against him.”  
Divided by Categories 
 For this section, we look at more descriptive statistics. Instead of merely looking 
at correlations, I divide the sample into categories based on a particular variable of 
interest. I then take the means of the other variables with the sample divided into 
categories. When I divide the sample into the most densely Muslim (95-100% Muslim), 
medium density (80-94%), and least dense (50-79%), if I say that a variable is highest for 
the most densely Muslim, and “consistent across categories,” I am saying that the 
variable increases from least dense to medium density, and from medium density to most 
dense. For instance, in Table 16 below, one can see that HDI in 2000 and 2006 increases 
consistently as one moves from least dense to most dense. When I say a certain variable 
moves in the “correct direction,” I mean that it accords with my preconceived hypothesis. 
For instance, if I have divided the sample by difficulty for women in obtaining land, 
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loans, and other property, I would say that the HDI figures move in the “correct 
direction” if higher HDI is associated with better access for women, which I have 
theorized would be conducive to more productive societies.  
Divided by Percentage Muslim 




percMus  percMus  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
50‐79%  0.64  0.57  0.60  29.68  0.26  4.26  8886 
80‐94%  0.87  0.62  0.62  29.11  0.29  3.40  7355 
95‐100%  0.99  0.65  0.73  27.36  0.61  2.92  11558 
From Table 16, dividing the countries into three categories, between 50 and 80 
percent Muslim, between 80 and 95 percent Muslim, and greater than 95 percent Muslim, 
and then taking the means for all variables, we notice several facts. First, one notices that 
conventional economic development statistics tend to rank the more densely Muslim 
countries higher.   HDI in 2000 and 2006, where there are the fewest missing values, the 
countries’ mean HDIs increase as they move into the more densely Muslim categories.  
For this category in particular, it will be useful to see the division of oil by percentage 
Muslim, as shown in Table 17. The average barrels exported per day for the most densely 
Muslim countries is about 1 million, whereas for the two less dense categories the 
average is around 0.3 million. This may explain some of the patterns in GDP and hdi that 










The GDP levels for all of the decades under study (1970s, 80s, 90s, 00s) are 
highest for the greater than 95 percent category, as suggested by the average real GDP 
from 1970 to 2007 statistic (though the 50 to 80 category beats the 80 to 95 category 
here). It is clear that the greater than 95 percent Muslim category is much richer than the 
two less densely Muslim categories. This can probably be explained by the fact that Islam 
was founded on the Arabian peninsula, and though it spread extensively beyond this area, 
the lands that have become Muslim that are further from this epicenter have retained a 
limited population of their old religion before the rise of Islam, though in the regions 
closest to the founding, any resistance was less enduring. And there are many countries in 
and around the Arabian Peninsula that are oil or natural gas rich, which can explain their 
higher degree of economic development. 




percMus  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
50‐79%  68.00  0.56  21.38  4.33  45.61%  46.46% 
90‐94%  74.23  0.57  21.36  5.28  45.86%  44.24% 
95‐100%  71.42  0.65  23.50  4.27  45.83%  44.72% 
 
Along with economic development generally come certain changes in the 
opportunities for women. From Table 18, one sees that the average marriage age for 
women is higher in the most densely Muslim countries. It is plausible that this is related 
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to the greater educational opportunities available in the richer most densely Muslim 
countries, but the statistics for the proportion of girls enrolled in primary education and 
secondary education do not reflect an advantage for the most densely Muslim countries. 
The literacy rate of females as a proportion of the literacy rate for males shows that the 
two more dense categories rank higher than the least dense. But this seems to be 
inconsistent with the earlier observation that the purely economic development was 
approximately the same for the two least dense categories, and significantly higher for the 
most dense. Thus, the most densely Muslim category is significantly richer than the less 
dense categories, but this is not uniformly translated into higher gender development.  
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
Table 19 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
percMus  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
50‐79%  2.67  ‐4.01  ‐4.75  ‐3.33  1.07  39,984  4.77  63.91 
90‐94%  2.65  ‐5.67  ‐6.03  ‐3.92  ‐2.30  16,746  4.96  69.29 
95‐100%  3.36  ‐6.55  ‐6.71  ‐4.21  ‐3.57  117,840  5.20  68.85 
From Table 19, one can see that the statistics in this category are more consistent 
across different variables. Besides the corruption measure, where the most densely 
Muslim category tends to be the least corrupt, the more densely Muslim countries tend to 
receive worse scores compared to the least dense in this section. Authoritarianism tends 
to increase consistently as I move from least dense to medium to most dense. The average 
battle deaths are significantly higher for the most densely Muslim category compared to 
the other two. Assuming high battle deaths implies consistent conflicts, then this result 
supports the description of Ishmael from the Bible noted earlier on in the paper (in 
footnote 1), with “his hand against every man and every man's hand against him.”  The 
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more densely Muslim countries also perform worse in terms of freeness of societies, as 
reflected in the freedom house score for political rights and civil liberties and the freedom 
of the press rating.  
Religious Freedom and Religious Law Statistics 
Table 20 
Religious freedom and Islamic institutions statistics 
percMus  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
50‐79%  6.68  0.55  1.36  0.45  0.09 
90‐94%  7.03  0.67  1.40  0.47  0.00 
95‐100%  15.84  1.80  2.30  0.85  0.25 
From Table 20, one sees that the more densely Muslim countries also tend to 
grant less religious freedom to minority religions. The restrictions on minority religions 
increases consistently as one moves from least dense to most dense. The proportion of 
countries having one official religion as opposed to no official state religion increases 
consistently as I move from least dense to most dense. And the tendency to have legal 
limitations on minority religions or for some or all minority religions to be illegal 
increases consistently as  I move from least dense to most dense. As one would expect, 
the greatest proportion of countries with the mention of Islamic law as a basis for their 
legal system is in the most densely Muslim category. Also, one fourth of the countries in 
the most dense category have “Sharia” mentioned, while none in the middle category 
have it, and only one in the least dense category. 
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Islamic institutions related to gender 
Table 21 
islamic institutions related to gender 
percMus  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
50‐79%  0.66  0.83  0.75  0.63  0.13  0.30  0.31  0.51 
90‐94%  0.91  0.83  0.79  0.64  0.13  0.03  0.28  0.38 
95‐100%  0.81  0.82  0.98  0.67  0.35  0.25  0.56  0.37 
Referring to Table 21, the patterns in this category vary across different variables. 
There are quite a few missing values in this category, and anomalies in the data could be 
from missing values. But from what I can see, polygamy is accepted more in the two 
denser categories relative to the least dense. Inheritance is consistently more male-biased 
as I move across categories from the least dense to the most dense. A deficiency in legal 
protection for women against violence increases consistently as I move across categories 
from least dense to most dense, though the differences between categories is small. There 
are significantly more missing women in the most dense category compared to the other 
two. The free movement of women variable is actually worse in the least dense countries. 
The veil variable is by a significant degree the highest in the most densely Muslim 
countries; their women tend to be obliged to wear the veil in public. The variables for 
difficulty for women in obtaining land, loans, and property other than land are in general 
in the “wrong direction.” The most discrimination against women in these variables tends 
to be in the least densely Muslim countries. I have to remember though, that there are 
several countries in this category that are 75% Muslim, and the average percentage in this 
category is 64%. So in comparing the most densely Muslim countries with the least 
densely Muslim, it is not like I are comparing predominantly Muslim countries with 
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predominantly Christian countries. I are all still dealing in the same general category of 
majority Muslim countries. 
Conclusion of divided by percent Muslim categories 
There are some patterns that emerge from the above analysis. Primarily, the most 
densely Muslim countries tend to be the most wealthy, but this wealth does not 
necessarily translate into free and liberal societies. The most densely Muslim also tend to 
be the most authoritarian and the least free, with the greatest restrictions on minority 
religions. They also tend to score poorly on certain variables that would tend to make life 
more difficult for women, such as male-biased inheritance, lack of laws protecting 
women against violence, and more missing women (which is a sign of preference for 
males at birth and during childrearing); However, the least densely Muslim tend to score 
worse on other variables in this category, such as difficulty in obtaining land, loans, or 
other property for women. Though there is a certain degree of ambiguity in this last 
category of Islamic institutions related to gender, the fact of ambiguity gives a rebuttal to 
the theory that wealth brings universal modernization and liberalization of society, since 
the most densely Muslim are the richest. 
Divided by Region 
Table 22 
demographics 
region  N  percMus  relFrac 
Africa  14  0.84  0.28 
Asia & Pacif.  12  0.85  0.33 
Eur  2  0.85  0.24 
N.Af. & M.E.  18  0.90  0.30 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Firstly, one should note that from Table 22 we see that the average percent 
Muslim is highest in the Middle East & North Africa region with 90%, with the other 
three regions being about 85% Muslim each. Therefore, some of the characterizations of 
this region relative to the others will parallel the characterizations of the most densely 
Muslim category in the above analysis for this reason.  However, there are many 
differences, and these differences reveal distinguishing characteristics of the various 
regions. Another item to note is that the Europe region is composed of only two 
countries, Turkey and Albania. Therefore, the statistics of this region will be highly 
influenced by these two countries. When one notices that Europe is an outlier for one 
particular statistic, it does not necessarily mean that “European Islam” is very distinct in 
this category. For example, Europe’s “violence against women” variable is 0.75, which 
reflects that there is no legislation in place to protect women against violence; while there 
is planned legislation, this legislation is of a general nature. This 0.75 is significantly 
worse than the average for the other regions, but it reflects only the status of said 
legislation in Albania, as there is a missing value for Turkey here.   
Economic development statistics 
Table 23 
economic development statistics 
region  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
Africa  0.45  0.47  39.02  0.61  2.46  1853.99 
Asia & Pacif.  0.65  0.68  25.83  ‐1.36  5.16  8438.09 
Eur  0.77  0.80  15.69  1.39  4.30  4098.82 
N.Af. & M.E.  0.70  0.77  24.03  1.38  2.80  16574.51 
Referring to Table 23, HDI is the highest for the European countries, but GDP per 
capita is significantly higher in the Middle East & North Africa compared to the other 
regions. Also, GDP per capita is higher in the Asia & Pacific countries compared to 
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Europe, but Europe significantly beats the Asia & Pacific countries in HDI. The birthrate 
is by far the lowest in Europe. This may be due to European cultural traditions, or just 
reflecting the fact that the two European countries in the sample have adapted a more 
“modernized” tradition. The birthrate is by a large margin the highest in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This likely reflects the significantly lower economic development in Africa, 
which is generally accompanied by higher birthrates.  
Development and gender statistics 
Table 24 
development and gender statistics 
region  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEdu  secEdu 
Africa  59.83  0.43  20.18  9.08  0.44  0.44 
Asia & Pacif.  78.11  0.61  22.11  3.11  0.46  0.45 
Eur  82.00  0.73  23.00  3.15  0.48  0.43 
N.Af. & M.E.  75.72  0.70  23.67  2.06  0.47  0.46 
Referring to Table 24, sub-Saharan Africa performs the worst in terms of 
traditional gender development statistics. Out of the remaining three, Europe is the most 
“modern” in terms of female literacy as a proportion of male literacy, gender-related 
development index, and primary education, while the Middle East & North Africa region 




Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
Table 25 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
region  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
Africa  2.48  ‐5.14  ‐4.61  ‐3.45  0.61  20778  4.62  62.15 
Asia & Pacif.  2.33  ‐2.15  ‐4.33  ‐2.21  ‐1.84  80794  5.04  72.08 
Eur  4.00  ‐1.15  ‐2.70  5.85  7.15  19609  3.00  50.50 
N.Af. & M.E.  3.63  ‐7.80  ‐8.18  ‐6.55  ‐4.97  100236  5.53  70.89 
Referring to Table 25, interestingly, the Middle East and North Africa region 
performs the worst of any region in most categories characterizing aspects of political 
rule and political/civil freedom, though it is the richest region. Though it is the second 
least corrupt region (behind Europe), it was the most authoritarian in every decade in our 
sample (1970s to 2000s), had the least freedom and civil liberties according to the 
freedom house classifications, was only narrowly beaten by Asia & Pacific for the least 
freedom of the press, and had by far the greatest average battle deaths of any region. The 
greatest battle deaths being in the Middle East and North Africa (predominantly Arab, 
hence physically descended from Ishmael) lend more support to the notion that the sons 
of Ishmael would be a “wild donkey,” consistently in conflict with other nations. The 
other notable observation about these statistics is that the European countries tend to 
perform the “best” in each category. 
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Religious freedom and Islamic institutions statistics 
Table 26 
Religious freedom and Islamic institutions statistics 
region  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
Africa  6.60  0.71  1.14  0.57  0.07 
Asia & Pacif.  11.43  1.00  1.83  0.50  0.17 
Eur  7.50  0.00  2.00  0.00  0.00 
N.Af. & M.E.  13.96  1.67  2.22  0.83  0.17 
Referring to Table 26, the sub-Saharan Africa countries, though the poorest, tend 
to place the fewest legal restrictions on minority religions. They have the least average 
restrictions and tend to fall closer to the “no legal limitations” end of the spectrum rather 
than the “some or all minority religions are illegal” end. The Middle East and North 
Africa is the worst in this category, with the highest average restrictions on minority 
religions, the highest percentage of countries with one official religion, and the region 
most towards the “some or all minority religions are illegal” end of the spectrum. It is 
interesting to note that though Albania and Turkey both have no official state religion, 
there are some limitations placed upon minority religions, with Turkey being by far the 
worst of the two countries.  The Middle East & North Africa region has the highest 
percentage of countries with Islam mentioned as a basis for the legal system, and it ties 
Asia & Pacific with the highest percentage of Sharia specifically being mentioned.  
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Islamic institutions related to gender 
Table 27 
Islamic institutions related to gender 
region  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
Africa  0.93  0.90  0.81  0.65  0.11  0.16  0.37  0.63 
Asia & Pacif.  0.80  0.75  0.73  0.60  0.25  0.33  0.38  0.37 
Eur  0.00  0.20  0.20  0.75    0.00  0.00  0.40 
N.Af. & M.E.  0.83  0.84  0.96  0.68  0.26  0.20  0.47  0.30 
Referring to Table 27, besides the two European countries having on average 
across most categories the most “modern” of institutions related to gender and Islam 
(with quite a few missing values for Turkey however), there is no region that performs 
worst across the board. However, various statistics merit some discussion. Polygamy 
being the highest in sub-Saharan Africa is probably due to a long-standing cultural 
tradition rather than an Islamic institution. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the most likely to 
say that parental authority is not equal between the mother and the father, and be the most 
difficult place for a woman to obtain land, loans, or other property. The Middle East and 
North Africa, on the other hand, have the most male-biased inheritance by a significant 
degree, the most missing women, and the highest obligation to wear the veil in public. 
While the categories that Sub-Saharan Africa is the worst performer in are not 
specifically derivable from Islamic institutions, and could simply reflect a general gender 
discriminatory tradition, two out of the three categories that the Middle East & North 
Africa are the worst performers in can be specifically traced to early Islamic institutions: 
the veil is in the Quran and Hadith, and the male-biased inheritance also comes from 
early Islamic law.  
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Conclusion of divided by region categories 
The Middle East & North Africa stands out as the richest region, and also in some ways 
the most “Islamic.” It has the highest average percent Muslim per country, it is the region 
with the highest frequency of Islam as the official religion, it contains the most 
restrictions placed upon minority religions, and it is the region where the veil is 
obligatory the most. Europe is the most “modern” in many respects, perhaps reflecting 
the influence of Europe on these countries. A premise of this paper is that the Muslim 
countries that were penetrated less by European influence will be more “Islamic” and less 
liberal. The fact that the two European Muslim countries are more liberal in many 
respects relative to the Middle East and North Africa countries supports this idea.  






This variable is actually one of the most interesting in terms of predicting other 
institutional characteristics, especially those specifically related to gender and arguably 
Islam. 
Economic development statistics 
Table 29 
economic development statistics 
obligation  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
none  0.66  0.69  26.47  1.46  2.94  9456 
some or all  0.53  0.62  31.35  1.43  2.45  8002 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Referring to Table 29, Absence of obligation to wear the veil is associated with 
higher GDP per capita, marginally higher growth, higher hdi, and lower birthrate. 
Development and gender statistics 
Table 30 
development and gender statistics 
obligation  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
none  69.54  0.64  23.62  3.43  0.46  0.45 
some or all  69.41  0.56  21.27  4.93  0.45  0.46 
Referring to Table 30, Absence of obligation to wear the veil on average 
corresponds with higher gender-related development index, higher marriage age, and less 
discrimination against girls in secondary school. 




obligation  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battled  FHscore  freePress 
none  3.44  ‐6.89  ‐6.67  ‐3.53  ‐0.63  39710  4.46  61.50 
some or all  3.06  ‐6.02  ‐6.38  ‐3.89  ‐2.17  55733  5.26  69.65 
Referring to Table 31, absence of obligation to wear the veil corresponds to less 
corruption; fewer battle deaths; and more freedom according to the freedom house and 
freedom of the press ratings, though the polity variable switches throughout the decades.  




obligation  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
none  6.35  1.00  1.71  0.57  0.00 
some or all  12.73  1.41  1.88  0.71  0.18 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Referring to Table 32, obligation to wear the veil is found with significantly 
greater restrictions on minority religions, tend to have Islam as the official state religion 
as opposed to none, and tend to have more legal limitations or else ban minority 
religions.  The group of countries where obligation to wear the veil is absent tend to have 
Islam mentioned as a basis for their legal system less frequently. They also never have 
Sharia mentioned. 




obligation  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
none  0.73  0.78  0.74  0.58  0.12  0.01  0.00  0.29 
some or all  0.92  0.86  0.96  0.66  0.30  0.36  0.77  0.52 
Referring to Table 33, this section is in some ways the most interesting. The 
differences in other Islamic institutions statistics related to gender are great when 
predicted by the absence or presence of the obligation to wear the veil. As one can see, 
absence of obligation to wear the veil is associated with less acceptance of polygamy, 
greater affirmation of equality in authority between mother and father in the home, less 
male-biased inheritance, better laws in place to protect women against violence, 
significantly fewer missing women, almost no restrictions on the free movement of 
women around the country, and better access for women to land, loans, and other 
property.   
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Referring to Table 34, the average percent Muslim tends to be smaller as 
women’s access gets lower. This could be because the sub-Saharan African countries 
tend to perform the worst on these variables, and they on average have the lowest percent 
Muslim, with 81% average.  
Economic development statistics 
Table 35 
economic development statistics 
landLoanProp  hdi90  hdi95  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
High access  0.68  0.73  0.76  0.78  21.66  1.57  3.01  14495 
Med access  0.61  0.65  0.67  0.70  24.19  1.66  2.47  6049 
Low access  0.48  0.47  0.45  0.54  36.13  1.25  2.95  5025 
Referring to Table 35, the values are all generally in the correct direction for hdi 
and birthrate. Less access is associated with lower hdi and a higher birthrate. There do 
not seem to be any systematic patterns with regards to GDP per capita growth rates. 
Average GDP is lowest for least access, and the pattern is consistently “lower access, 
lower GDP” as one moves along categories, except in the case of land, where the middle 
category is the richest. 
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Development and gender statistics 
Table 36 
development and gender statistics 
landLoanProp  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
High access  79.29  0.72  24.29  0.76  0.48  0.48 
Med access  71.01  0.63  23.31  1.68  0.47  0.47 
Low access  60.57  0.48  20.71  7.91  0.44  0.42 
Referring to Table 36, all of the variables here are generally in the “correct 
direction.” That is, as access is reduced, female literacy declines, gender-related 
development index declines, average marriage age declines, measure of female 
discrimination in secondary school increases, and primary and secondary education 
enrollment decreases. 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
Table 37 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
landLoanProp  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battled  FHscore  freePress 
High access  3.70  ‐6.81  ‐6.73  ‐5.11  ‐3.08  74802  5.27  70.05 
Med access  3.13  ‐6.78  ‐7.21  ‐3.87  ‐0.07  65542  4.44  64.06 
Low access  2.90  ‐5.88  ‐5.90  ‐2.48  ‐1.08  28855  4.83  63.32 
Referring to Table 37, generally the corruption index trends in the “correct 
direction.” That is, less access corresponds with more corruption. The polity variables 
don’t seem to show a systematic pattern. If anything, more access is associated with more 
authoritarianism. With regard to battle deaths, there is no consistent pattern across 
categories, but the countries with the least access tend to have the least battle deaths 
(contrary to hypothesis). Because authoritarianism and the freedom indices are so closely 
linked, the places with the most access also tend to be the least free.   
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Religious freedom and Islamic institution statistics 
Table 38 
Religious freedom and Islamic institutions statistics 
landLoanProp  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
High access  12.79  1.67  2.17  0.84  0.16 
Med access  6.90  0.90  1.91  0.60  0.00 
Low access  9.63  0.99  1.60  0.50  0.10 
Referring to Table 38, we do not obtain consistent patterns as we move down the 
scale, but the places with the most access tend to be the most restricted for minority 
religions. The places with the most access tend to have Islamic law mentioned as a basis 
for their legal system. This is consistent as we move along the categories.  
Islamic institutions related to gender 
Table 39 
Islamic institutions related to gender 
landLoanProp  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov 
High access  0.75  0.79  0.86  0.66  0.28  0.09 
Med access  0.72  0.78  0.77  0.56  0.17  0.04 
Low access  0.94  0.86  0.90  0.63  0.20  0.35 
             
landLoanProp  veil  land  loan  prop  landLoanProp   
High access  0.35  0.32  0.04  0.05  0.14   
Med access  0.12  0.40  0.29  0.28  0.32   
Low access  0.58  0.84  0.53  0.60  0.66   
Referring to Table 39, least access is associated with most acceptance of 
polygamy; least likely to say that mother/father have equal authority in the household; 
most likely to have male-biased inheritance; protection against violence against women 
laws are more deficient than average, though not always worst; missing women are 
average or below average; free movement of women is significantly the most restrictive; 
the veil is worn the most here. And the variables all go in the “correct direction” one with 
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another. That is, I have less access in one variable associated with less access in the 
others.  








Referring to Table 40, the countries that have Islamic law on average 90% 
Muslim versus 80% without, and the religious fractionalization numbers correspond 
accordingly. 
Economic Development Statistics 
Table 41 
economic development statistics 
islamLaw  hdi90  hdi95  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
0  0.52  0.50  0.55  0.58  31.19  ‐0.45  3.88  2787.55 
1  0.65  0.67  0.69  0.71  26.82  0.96  3.11  13732.48 
Referring to Table 41, the countries with Islamic law mentioned tend to be richer, 
have lower birthrates, and have higher HDI. One possible reason for the great difference 
in average incomes of the two groups is that the countries with Islam as a basis for their 
legal system are much more oil-rich. As can be seen in Table 42, they on average export 
almost 1 million barrels of oil per day, whereas the countries that do not have Islam as an 









Development and Gender Statistics 
Table 43 
development and gender statistics 
islamLaw  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
0  66.20  0.54  20.53  6.30  0.45  0.42 
1  74.92  0.64  23.38  3.64  0.46  0.47 
Referring to Table 43, corresponding with the economic development statistics, 
the countries with Islamic law tend to have higher female literacy, better gender-related 
development index, higher average marrying age, and more females in secondary and 
primary school.  
Characteristics of Political Rule and Political/Civil Freedom 
Table 44 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
IslamLaw  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
0  2.55  ‐4.25  ‐5.68  ‐1.51  1.94  30,245  4.26  61.82 
1  3.22  ‐6.48  ‐6.30  ‐5.36  ‐4.65  89,038  5.48  71.39 
Referring to Table 44, the countries with Islamic law tend to be less corrupt. 
However, the countries with Islamic law tend to be more authoritarian, have significantly 
more battle deaths, and be less free according to the freedom house political rights/civil 
liberties measure and freedom of the press rating. 
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Religious Freedom and Islamic Institutions Statistics 
Table 45 
Religious freedom and religious law statistics 
islamLaw  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  sharia 
0  4.80  0.24  1.24  0.00 
1  14.28  1.66  2.10  0.21 
 Referring to Table 45, the countries with Islamic law also tend to place the most 
restrictions on minority religions, be the most likely to have one official religion as 
opposed to no official religion(s), and are closer to the side of “some or all minority 
religions are illegal” on the spectrum of “in practice, relationship between minority 
religion(s) and state.”  
Islamic Institutions Related to Gender 
Table 46 
islamic institutions related to gender 
islamLaw  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
0  0.70  0.81  0.69  0.63  0.06  0.18  0.30  0.52 
1  0.87  0.83  0.96  0.66  0.31  0.21  0.47  0.35 
Referring to Table 46, interestingly, besides the three variables of women’s access 
to land, loans, and property, all of these variables go in the “right direction,” though some 
differences are smaller than others. That is, the Muslim countries where Islam is 
mentioned as a basis of the legal system tend to be associated with “more backward” or 
“stricter” or “more old-fashioned” expressions of Islam. They tend to have greater 
acceptance of polygamy, slightly greater acceptance of the idea that both parents do not 
share equal authority in the home, more male-biased inheritance, greater deficiency in 
laws protecting women against violence, far greater missing women, more restrictions on 
women’s free movement, and the obligation to wear the veil in public is more prevalent. 
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The access to land, loans, and property variables go in the “wrong direction.” That is, the 
presence of Islamic law tends to be associated with more liberal societies when measured 
along these dimensions. This is partially due to the proportionally greater number of sub-
Saharan African countries in the “no Islamic law” category, and the fact that they tend to 
perform worse on these dimensions.  
Conclusion of Islamic Law Section 
Here, I have a picture that is similar to what I have found previously. With 
societies where Islam is mentioned as a basis for their legal system, they are in some 
sense “more Islamic.” They have a greater proportion of Muslims, and tend to be more 
accepting of traditional Islamic practices, though these may be deemed objectionable to 
the West, such as polygamy, obligating women to wear the veil, and biasing inheritance 
to the male. Along certain lines, these countries appear to be better places to live for 
women and for both genders. They are significantly richer, have a higher hdi, higher 
literacy rate for females and greater enrollment for females in primary and secondary 
education, and greater access to land, loans, and property for females. They are also less 
corrupt compared to the no Islamic law group. However, along other lines, they are a 
worse place to live for citizens of both genders, and in particular women. They are more 
authoritarian, more conflict-ridden, and less free. They have greater restrictions placed on 
minority religions, which would obviously make life more difficult for a member of a 
minority religion. These societies also tend to be more deficient in laws protecting 
women against violence, have more missing women, and have more restrictions on the 
free movement of women. If one thinks of the practice of polygamy, the obligation to 
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wear the veil, and male-biased inheritance as negative for women, then these places are 
inferior along these lines as well.  
The pattern that I see in the more “Islamic countries” is one of the strong taking 
advantage of the weak, or the strong ruling in an almost totalitarian way, just because 
they are strong and they can. In terms of political rule and civil freedom, the more 
“Islamic” countries tend to be more authoritarian, and have less freedom. This is a case of 
the strong, the ruling powers, oppressing the weak—the ruled. The religious freedom 
statistics tell a similar story. The more “Islamic” countries tend to restrict minority 
religions and in some cases declare them illegal. This is a case of the strong, the majority 
religion, oppressing the weak—the minority religion. In the places where there is Islamic 
law and there are more restrictions on minority religions, there are also fewer members of 
minority religions, which would of course make these minority members even weaker 
than where there are a greater number. Therefore, it aligns with my hypothesis that the 
strong will take advantage over the weak because they are strong.  And again, when one 
considers that females are the physically weaker sex, and the sex that has wielded less 
power in society historically, the higher degree of repression of women found along 
certain dimensions of the Islamic institutional variables supports the notion of the strong 
oppressing the weak because they are stronger. 
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Referring to Table 47, the places with more restrictions on minority religions tend 
to have the highest proportion of Muslims in the population and be the least religiously 
fractionalized. This would make sense under the assumption that where minority 
religions are greater in numbers, they would have more power and be able to reduce or 
eradicate legislation that is intended to restrict their rights. 
Economic Development Statistics 
Table 48 
economic development statistics 
restrMinRel  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
1 low  0.53  0.56  33.20  ‐0.47  3.67  3809.96 
2 medium  0.69  0.70  28.59  1.29  1.93  9350.44 
3 high  0.67  0.74  23.63  0.46  4.59  15632.78 
Referring to Table 48, the places with more restrictions tend to be richer and have 
higher hdi and lower birthrate. This pattern is “consistent across categories” and the 
differences between the least restrictions category and the most restrictions category are 
great. The growth rates don’t show consistent patterns. As I saw before, the countries 
with above average restrictions export on average about 1 million barrels of oil per day, 
whereas the countries with below average restrictions export about one-quarter million 
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barrels per day on average, which could explain the difference between the above 
statistics. 
Development and Gender Statistics 
Table 49 
development and gender statistics 
restrMinRel  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
1 low  63.54  0.51  20.43  6.82  0.45  0.42 
2 medium  69.46  0.64  23.83  4.06  0.46  0.47 
3 high  81.21  0.68  22.70  2.72  0.46  0.47 
Referring to Table 49, the places with the most restrictions tend to perform the 
best with regards to these statistics. They have the highest female literacy as a proportion 
of male literacy, the highest score on the gender-related development index, the best 
score on the female discrimination in secondary school measure, and are approximately 
tied with the medium category for proportion of females in primary school and secondary 
school. These statistics are mostly “consistent across categories.” 
Characteristics of Political Rule and Political/Civil Freedom 
Table 50 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
restrMinRel  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
1 low  2.64  ‐4.65  ‐5.47  ‐2.22  1.34  25262  4.33  60.40 
2 medium  3.28  ‐5.21  ‐5.67  ‐3.79  ‐3.37  48271  5.30  72.53 
3 high  3.01  ‐7.68  ‐7.35  ‐6.05  ‐4.80  132613  5.43  70.40 
Referring to Table 50, the countries with the least restrictions are the most 
corrupt, though the least corrupt are the medium category. The Polity IV variable reveals 
that the more restrictions on minority religions the country has, the more authoritarian the 
country is. This is consistent across categories. The battle deaths also increase 
consistently as I move across categories from least restrictions to most. I also get less free 
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as I move from least restrictions to most, as measured by freedom house and freedom of 
the press ratings. 
Religious Freedom and Islamic Institution Statistics 
Table 51 
Religious freedom statistics 
restrMinRel  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
1 low  1.56  0.25  0.88  0.25  0.00 
2 medium  9.73  1.60  2.00  0.87  0.07 
3 high  21.66  1.60  2.53  0.80  0.33 
Referring to Table 51, the countries with the most restrictions tend to have Islam 
as their one official religion and to some degree as a basis for their legal system, whereas 
the countries with few or no restrictions tend to not have an official religion and not have 
Islam mentioned as a basis for their legal system. The high restriction countries also tend 
to be closer to the end of the spectrum that “some or all minority religions are illegal.” 
The countries with a low number of restrictions do not have any countries with Sharia 
law, whereas one-third of the countries with a high number of restrictions have some 
form of Sharia. 
Islamic institutions related to gender 
Table 52 
islamic institutions related to gender 
restrMinRel  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
1 low  0.79  0.88  0.77  0.60  0.12  0.17  0.23  0.51 
2 medium  0.74  0.85  0.95  0.59  0.21  0.18  0.36  0.31 
3 high  0.93  0.70  0.87  0.79  0.31  0.27  0.79  0.42 
Referring to Table 52, the places with higher number of restrictions tend to be the 
most accepting of polygamy, have more male-biased inheritance, the most deficiency in 
laws protecting women against violence, the most missing women, the greatest 
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restrictions on free movement of women, and the veil is most obligatory. However, they 
tend to believe in equality of parents relatively more, and less restrictions upon women 
with regards to access to land and loans.   
Divided by Exindex1 
I created “extremity indexes” by normalizing variables that seemed important 
predictors of societal or economic variables, and then taking a simple average or a 
weighted average of the variables. The higher a country is on this index, the more 
“extreme” it is, because I consider discrimination against girls in education, obligation to 
wear the veil in public, and restricted access for women to land, loans, and other property 
to all be indicators of a more “extreme” or backward expression of Islam in the society 
(one less open historically to adapting Western norms). I demonstrated above where these 
variables are linked with other negative societal outcomes. Exindex1 is equal to 
(1/6)*(FemDisc + FemLit + Veil  + Land + Loan + Prop), while Exindex2 is equal to 








Referring to Table 53, the “most extreme” has significantly the smallest 
percentage Muslims in this index (81%), while the medium category has the most (91%). 
56 
 




Exindex1  hdi90  hdi95  hdi00  hdi06  birthrate  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
1. high  0.48  0.46  0.40  0.48  39.29  0.28  3.84  3713 
2. medium  0.58  0.61  0.66  0.68  26.55  0.89  2.10  8149 
3. low  0.68  0.71  0.74  0.79  19.42  0.71  4.83  14416 
Referring to Table 54, these statistics are all what one would expect: that is, the 
most extreme performs the worst in terms of hdi (for all years) and average real GDP. It 
also has the highest birthrate. These numbers are consistent across categories, and the 
differences are large. 
Development and Gender Statistics 
Table 55 
development and gender statistics 
Exindex1  litFem  grdi  marAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
1. high  55.15  0.43  20.33  10.59  0.42  0.40 
2. medium  73.42  0.64  22.22  4.06  0.47  0.45 
3. low  87.93  0.73  24.45  ‐0.76  0.48  0.50 
Referring to Table 55, these statistics also all go in the direction one would 
expect. The most extreme have the lowest percentage of female literacy to male literacy 
(consistent across categories, but part of the measure), the lowest gender-related 
development index (consistent), the lowest average marriage age (consistent), the highest 




Characteristics of Political Rule and Political/Civil Freedom 
Table 56 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
Exindex1  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
1. high  2.42  ‐5.84  ‐6.26  ‐3.91  ‐2.24  103523  4.92  64.00 
2. medium  3.46  ‐6.52  ‐6.42  ‐2.24  ‐0.04  36339  4.62  64.92 
3. low  3.46  ‐5.80  ‐6.72  ‐5.57  ‐3.22  63356  5.21  69.36 
Referring to Table 56, the most extreme here are the most corrupt and have the 
highest number of battle deaths, but they are not the most authoritarian, in fact they are 
the least in three out of four decades, they are not the least free either.  
Religious Freedom and Islamic Institution Statistics 
Table 57 
Religious freedom statistics 
Exindex1  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
1. high  10.88  0.92  1.62  0.62  0.15 
2. medium  10.57  1.23  1.85  0.62  0.15 
3. low  11.97  1.29  2.00  0.64  0.00 
Referring to Table 57, interestingly, the “most extreme” here are not the worst 
places to live for members of minority religions. The least extreme in this index tends to 
perform worse in these statistics.  The differences in the Islamic law statistic are 




Islamic Institutions Related to Gender 
Table 58 
islamic institutions related to gender 
Exindex1  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
1. high  0.95  0.92  0.94  0.75  0.25  0.36  0.58  0.71 
2. medium  0.78  0.76  0.81  0.51  0.27  0.13  0.43  0.36 
3. low  0.64  0.77  0.81  0.65  0.13  0.06  0.13  0.11 
Referring to Table 58, these variables all generally go in the “right direction.”  








Referring to Table 59, the distribution of percent Muslim is mostly equal across 
categories. 
Economic Development Statistics 
Table 60 
economic development statistics 
Exindex2  hdi00  hdi06  birth  gr90‐99  gr00‐07  gdp70‐07 
1. high  0.50  0.57  35.93  0.72  3.05  7889 
2. medium  0.59  0.63  28.54  ‐0.19  2.79  3481 
3. low  0.75  0.77  19.41  0.49  4.64  18594 
Referring to Table 60, greater extremity is linked with lower hdi and higher 
birthrate, which is consistent across categories. The least extreme are by far the richest, 
though the most extreme are richer than the middle category.  
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Development and Gender Statistics 
Table 61 
Development and gender statistics 
Exindex2  litFem  grdi  marrAge  femDisc  primEd  secEdu 
High  65.43  0.52  20.58  9.89  0.42  0.41 
Medium  66.71  0.58  21.82  4.05  0.46  0.45 
Low  89.00  0.72  24.25  ‐0.46  0.48  0.50 
Referring to Table 61, since female discrimination in school is part of our index, it 
is natural that greater equality in female literacy and gender-related development is found 
with lower extremity with this index.  
Characteristics of Political Rule and Political/Civil Freedom 
Table 62 
Characteristics of political rule and political/civil freedom 
Exindex2  corrupt  polity70s  polity80s  polity90s  polity00s  battleD  FHscore  freePress 
1. high  2.75  ‐7.19  ‐6.52  ‐4.14  ‐2.65  91332  5.43  70.20 
2. med.  2.93  ‐4.48  ‐6.18  ‐2.51  0.49  51654  4.33  59.87 
3. low  3.29  ‐5.38  ‐5.27  ‐5.28  ‐4.33  49444  5.32  72.93 
Referring to Table 62, greater extremity is associated with more corruption and 
more battle deaths, which is consistent across categories. However, the authoritarianism 
and freedom variables do not show consistent patterns.  
Religious Freedom and Islamic Institution Statistics 
Table 63 
Religious freedom statistics 
Exindex2  restrMinRel  offRel  relgStat  islamLaw  sharia 
1. high  12.19  1.20  1.87  0.73  0.33 
2. medium  8.27  0.93  1.53  0.47  0.00 
3. low  11.93  1.20  1.93  0.73  0.07 
Referring to Table 63, the variables in this section also do not show consistent 
patterns across most of the variables. The most extreme does however by far have the 
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most instances of Sharia law. Along this dimension I can link the extremity index to a 
more “Islamic” society. 
Islamic Institutions Related to Gender 
Table 64 
islamic institutions related to gender 
Exindex2  polygamy  parent  inherit  viol  miss  freeMov  veil  landLoanProp 
1. high  0.97  0.91  0.92  0.77  0.31  0.37  0.69  0.58 
2. medium  0.69  0.78  0.81  0.53  0.16  0.10  0.30  0.38 
3. low  0.67  0.71  0.81  0.64  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.11 
Referring to Table 64, these variables generally go in the “correct direction.” The 
more extreme countries tend to have a higher acceptance of polygamy; tend to not see 
parental authority as equal between mother and father; tend to bias inheritance toward the 
male; tend to have a greater deficiency in laws protecting women against violence; tend 
to have more missing women; and tend to have greater restrictions on the free movement 
of women (and since it is a part of the index, naturally have greater obligation to wear the 




ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
 I want to examine the relationship between economic outcomes and scores on the 
extremity scales. I hypothesize that a high score on the extremity index will be 
disadvantageous to having high levels of economic growth. To test that hypothesis, I run 
regressions where the dependent variable is the average growth over one of three periods, 
1990 to 1999, 2000 to 2007, and 1990 to 2007. The reason for examining the effects in 
the two decades separately is that there was a boom in oil prices in the 2000s, whereas 
there was not in the 1990s. The control variables include the natural logarithm of the 
GDP level in an earlier year (1970) to control for initial condition; school life expectancy 
as a control for average human capital; a dummy variable for if a country is a producer of 




Extremity Indexes and 1990s Growth 
Table 65 
Dependent variable = gdpGrowth90to99     
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Exindex1  ‐7.85***  ‐5.86***     
  (0.001)  (0.006)     
Exindex2      ‐6.30***  ‐5.31** 
      (0.006)  (0.016) 
lnGDP70  ‐0.355  ‐0.43  ‐0.444  ‐0.343 
  (0.309)  (0.253)  0.21  (0.345) 
Price investment 1990  0.0175**    0.0205*** 
  (0.011)    (0.005)   
oilexporter  2.75***    2.77***   
  (0.003)    (0.004)   
schoolLifeExpectancy  ‐0.425**    ‐0.292   
  (0.027)    (0.118)   
Constant  7.88**  6.84*  5.81**  5.25 
  (0.014)  (0.06)  (0.048)  (0.124) 
         
N  35  36  36  38 
R2  0.55  0.21  0.49  0.15 
Adj. R2  0.48  0.16  0.41  0.11 
As one can see from Table 65 above, the extremity indexes are found to have a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with average growth over the period 
1990-1999. That is, the more extreme, the lower the average growth rate. For exindex1 
and exindex2, I have strong negative coefficients in the regressions with full controls 
(lnGDP70, pi1990, oilexporter, and schoolLifeExpectancy), and I also have strong 




Extremity Indexes and 2000s Growth 
Table 66 
Dependent variable = gdpGrowth00to07   
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Exindex1  4.54     
  (0.110)     
Exindex2    5.83**  5.93** 
    (0.024)  (0.023) 
lnGDP70  ‐0.514  ‐0.574  ‐0.481 
  (0.306)  (0.199)  (0.279) 
pi2000  ‐0.0185  ‐0.021  ‐0.027** 
  (0.243)  (0.152)  (0.047) 
oilexporter  1.61  1.46   
  (0.169)  (0.188)   
schoolLifeExpectancy  0.301  0.336  0.43** 
  (0.209)  (0.115)  (0.037) 
Constant  2.91  3.25  2.92 
  (0.456)  (0.326)  (0.381) 
       
N  35  36  36 
R2  0.31  0.36  0.32 
Adj. R2  0.19  0.26  0.24 
From Table 66 above, one can see that the regression coefficients for the 
extremity indexes are now positive. Exindex3 is not quite significant at the 0.10 level, but 
exindex8 is significant at the 0.05 level for a specification with the full set of controls and 
the specification with the oil dummy removed. In fact, all the various forms of the 
extremity index tested flipped signs from the 90s decade to the 2000s. It is surprising that 
the sign flipped, and casts doubt upon the validity of the extremity indexes as factors in 
determining growth rates, upon the hypothesis that more extremity leads to lower growth. 
The following section investigates this issue further, focusing on oil’s possible role in 
disturbing the visible link between institutional variables and growth outcomes. 
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Investigation into Why the Changed Sign 























 From Table 67, one can see that oil is a very important determinant of average 
growth rates over the whole period of 1990-2007. In fact it is the most significant 
explanatory factor (with p-value = 0.000), while the initial condition is also a statistically 
significant variable, with the negative coefficient lending credence to the convergence 
hypothesis. Our extremity indexes are not significant over this averaged time period.  
65 
 
Blurring Institutional Variables 
Table 68 
Dependent variable = gdpGrowth90to99, (1), (3), (5), (7); =gdpGrowth00to07 (2), (4), (6), (8) 
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
corruption  0.87**  ‐0.09             
  (0.014)  (0.818)             
polity70s‐00s      0.20*  ‐0.062         
      (0.060)  (0.594)         
Birthrate          ‐0.13***  ‐0.03  ‐0.086*  0.027 
          (0.002)  (0.472)  (0.083)  (0.622) 
lnGDP70  ‐0.73**  ‐0.26  0.079  ‐0.3  ‐0.54  ‐0.30  ‐0.54*  ‐0.36 
  (0.046)  (0.559)  (0.813)  (0.489)  (0.105)  (0.457)  (0.099)  (0.349) 
PriceInvest90  0.017***    0.018***    0.017***    0.015**   
  (0.005)    (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.014)   
PriceInvest00    ‐0.024*    ‐0.025    ‐0.028**    ‐0.021 
    (0.077)    (0.069)    (0.034)    (0.106) 
oilexporter  2.45***  1.85*  2.63  1.60      1.62  2.23* 
  (0.005)  (0.073)  (0.004)  (0.128)      (0.136)  (0.079) 
Constant  0.89  6.05  ‐2.38  5.93  7.50**  8.39**  5.3  5.31 
  (0.714)  (0.045)  0.366  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.04)  (0.157)  (0.21) 
                 
N  37  37  36  36  38  38  38  38 
R2  0.47  0.25  0.43  0.24  0.38  0.17  0.42  0.25 
Adj. R2  0.41  0.15  0.36  0.14  0.32  0.10  0.35  0.16 
The above figures in Table 68 lend support to the idea that the boom in oil prices 
in the 2000s could have had the effect of distorting or covering up the effect of various 
institutional variables’ effects on growth.  Comparing regressions (1) and (2) where 
corruption is the independent variable of interest, and the regressions are specified for the 
90s and 2000s, respectively, one sees that in the 1990s, the variable corruption has a 
positive relationship with growth (corruption is coded so that a higher score on a scale of 
1 to 10 corresponds to less corruption). This is an expected and uncontroversial finding. 
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However, in the parallel regression for the 2000s, one sees that the variable has the wrong 
sign and is in fact completely insignificant.  
The polityIV variable rates regimes on degree of authoritarianism and is coded 
from -10 to +10, with -10 being the most authoritarian rating possible, and +10 being the 
most democratic rating possible. In the 90s, having a higher average polity variable over 
the last 40 years corresponded to having higher growth, which generally corroborates 
with political science theories and findings. In the 2000s, the coefficient is of the wrong 
sign and is completely insignificant. 
Birthrate is often found to be negatively associated with growth. Places that have 
higher birthrates generally have lower growth rates. This is true in the 1990s, with or 
without a control dummy variable for oil (see (5) and (7)), but this coefficient is 
insignificant in the 2000s.  These patterns hint that the effects on growth of certain 
important institutional variables will be distorted or blurred in the 2000s relative to the 
90s, and the best explanation I can think of is that oil was such a dominant factor in the 
growth of the 2000s with the boom in prices, that other variables mattered less than they 
otherwise would have.  
The Switching Decades: 1990s Versus 2000s 
Though the above explanation may be adequate to explain the presence of an 
anomaly in the change in a coefficient from significant and in the expected direction to 
insignificant, further explanation is warranted for the switch in sign and remaining 






Regression   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
dependent variable  00s  90s  80s  00s  90s  80s 
             
90s  ‐0.43***      0.12*     
  (0.007)      (0.088)     
80s    0.23*      0.26***   
    (0.082)      (0.001)   
70s      ‐0.15      0.084 
      (0.212)      (0.254) 
Constant  3.58***  0.83*  ‐0.12  3.0***  1.22***  0.71** 
  (0.000)  (0.073)  (0.849)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.029) 
             
N  45  38  38  188  165  164 
R2  0.16  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.01 
Adj. R2  0.14  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.00 
Table 69 above is composed of regressions where the dependent variable is 
average growth rate in a particular decade and the independent variable is average growth 
rate in the preceding decade. The first three regressions include only Muslim majority 
countries, and the last three include all countries of the world. Examining regression (1), I 
see that higher growth in the 90s predicted lower growth in the 00s. This coefficient is 
economically large and statistically significant. The adjusted R2 is also large compared to 
the other regressions. By contrast, I see in (2) that the relationship between growth in the 
90s and growth in the 80s in the Muslim countries was positive, with a smaller 
coefficient, a lower significance level, and a lower R2 value; moreover, though the 
calculated relationship between growth in the 80s and growth in the 70s is negative, the 
coefficient is small and statistically insignificant, with a very low adjusted R2. These 
comparisons hint that the relationship between the 2000s and the 90s was an unusual one. 
The three regressions comparing growth in one decade to growth in the preceding decade 
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in the whole world also tell us that what was found in the Muslim world was unusual.  
The significant and insignificant relationships found in (4), (5), and (6) are positive, and 
the adjusted R2 is very low. These findings lead us to surmise that the relatively low oil 
prices in the 90s followed by the boom in prices in the 2000s explains a significant part 
of the variation in growth rates from the 90s decade to the 2000s in the Muslim countries.  
In both decades, oil contributed to growth, but in the 90s, I theorize that the 
detrimental effects of a more oppressive society were able to seep through and affect 
growth rates, while in the 2000s, with growth increasing so much within the sample, 
those same countries that had lesser growth rates due to higher extremity would now have 
higher growth rates due to the irrelevance in the extremity index caused by the boom in 
oil prices. Here is another way of expressing what could have happened. Imagine two 
countries, Extreme and Tolerant: both have a primary commodity such as oil. The two 
countries are identical except that the government of Extreme restricts some of its people 
economically, while Tolerant does not. During period 1, oil prices are low. In this period, 
while the people of Extreme and Tolerant have to work in many sectors of the economy 
in order to produce and trade and eat, Extreme will have lower productivity and lower 
growth since some workers are taken out of the workforce. In period 2, when oil prices 
are booming, assume that each country receives an equally large windfall of money from 
selling their oil reserves. With equal income increases in both countries from selling oil, 
the country that was originally poorer from period 1, Extreme, will have the higher 
growth rates in period 2, and it will look like higher extremity corresponds with lower 
growth in period 1 and higher growth in period 2. This is not a doubtlessly verified 
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hypothesis, but merely an untested theory for attempting to understand the observed 
phenomenon. 
One way to check if the extremity indexes are legitimate is to see how they 
perform in predicted growth in the 1980s and 1970s. The following regression results 
shown in Table 70 show that the extremity indexes are still important in explaining the 
variation in growth rates in the 1980s and the 1970s, and the more extreme countries are 
associated with lower growth rates. This is evidence that the extremity indexes’ 
importance in explaining growth was not just a fluke for the 1990s. Rather, the general 
trend is that a more extreme country will grow slower, with the opposite sign of the 





Regression   (1)  (2)  (3) 
dependent variable  80s  70s  70s 
       
Exindex1      ‐8.74*** 
      (0.002) 
Exindex2  ‐4.43**  ‐7.49***   
  (0.022)  (0.004)   
lnGDP70  ‐2.14***     
  (0.000)     
lnGDP60    ‐1.57*  ‐2.72*** 
    (0.051)  (0.002) 
Price investment 1980  ‐0.01*     
  (0.072)     
Price investment 1970    0.00  0.00 
    (0.917)  (0.993) 
oilexporter  0.89  1.11  0.401 
  (0.302)  (0.208)  (0.653) 
Constant  19.0***  2.75**  20.8*** 
  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.004) 
       
N  38  20  20 
R2  0.62  0.54  0.56 
Adj. R2  0.58  0.41  0.44 
Regressions were attempted to explore the effect of being a more explicitly 
“Islamic” country based on having Islamic law or Sharia as a basis for the legal system, 







The purpose of this paper was to shed light on the broad question of why Muslim 
countries generally lag behind the West economically, and to do so by testing the 
hypothesis that more extreme, strict, or old-fashioned Muslim societies grow more slowly 
compared to their relatively more culturally liberal/modern coreligionists, which would 
tell us that there may be something inherent in a strict, extreme form of Islam that hinders 
growth.  
It was found that a more explicitly “Islamic” Muslim country--as measured by 
Islam being the official state religion, Islam being an explicit source for the legal system, 
and having Sharia—was associated with various societal “bads,” such as more 
restrictions on minority religions, greater authoritarianism and less freedom, more battle 
deaths, and various poor outcomes for women related to their freedom and rights. 
Nonetheless, these countries did not experience inferior growth relative to their more 
liberal counterparts according to this dimension. In fact, they were on the whole richer 
than their counterparts. These countries are also on the whole much more oil rich, which 
may explain why they are wealthier.  
While I did not obtain the hypothesized result that a more explicitly “Islamic” 
Muslim country based on legal system would grow more slowly, I did obtain that a more 
“extreme” Muslim country, as measured by the treatment of women in the country along 
the lines of equality in education, obligation to wear the veil in public, and access to land, 
loans, and property would grow more slowly in general, after controlling for initial 
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income, whether the country exported a significant amount of oil, average school life 
expectancy, and initial investment level. Greater extremity as measured by this variable 
was associated with lower growth rates in the decades of the 90s, 80s, and 70s, but higher 
growth rates in the 2000s. I attempted to explain this odd result with an argument based 
on the oil boom of the 2000s obfuscating the visible effect of institutional factors.   
Perhaps the reason why countries that were more repressive of women tended to 
grow more slowly, whereas countries that were more repressive towards minority 
religions did not is due to the fact that women make up about one-half of the people, and 
restricting them economically could have a great effect on stifling overall productivity, 
whereas in the countries that were least amenable to minority religions, the percentage of 
non-Muslims in the country was low, and any difficulty they would experience in their 
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